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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE NATIVITY

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In its final canonical form the gospel story opens with a marvelous revival of procreative energy in senescence. Like the Baptist, Isaac, Joseph, Samson, Samuel and other Old Testament heroes had been born of one or both superannuated or else barren parents, whose reproductive energy seemed to be miraculously restored. Here Gabriel appears amidst the incense of the altar to an aged priest who is made aphasic before the people as a sign that his venerable and sterile wife shall bear a wondrous son. Nowhere was the passion for children which Ploss¹ has shown to be so strong and universal among lower races, more intense than among the ancient Hebrews. So here as incredulity yielded to certainty there was joy in the souls of this decrepit pair. Deities participate in many ways and degrees in the parenthood of great men, as Rank² has shown. John is only the herald, so that as this supernal reinforcement is given to his parents equal to that of the best in the Old Testament dispensation, it is already apparent that Jesus must be given a yet better one. Not to restore gerontic energy but to exercise this himself would be Yahveh's next step. There is a moving verisimilitude about the narrative of Luke the physician evangelist. Not only does modern psychoanalysis afford unnumbered cases of sex potency lost and won at all ages by suggestion (religious impressions being most effective among believers), but the literature concerning senescence shows often an "Indian summer" of restoration of this function. The curve of decline,

¹ Das Kind, 2d ed. Leipsic, 1911. Bd. 1, S. 1-24.

² Der Mythos von der Geburt des Helden. Leipsic, 1909. S. 93. English translation by F. Robbins and S. E. Jelliffe, N. Y., 1914. This is here traced in some detail in eleven cases.

too, is normally broken sometimes by repeated rises and falls before extinction is final. From the call of Abraham on, Jehovah often appears in a eugenic rôle if not as a master stirpiculturist and he exercises a unique control in this domain over his favorites. Moreover, as has often been conjectured from Nietzsche to Metchnikoff, possibly the complete or ideal overman will, like animals, be generative until he dies, and senescence, the dark counterpart of adolescence, will be done away. Now however the partial paralysis (here dumbness) such as may befall other functions in cases of the recrudescence of sex activity in the old, precedes instead of follows it. Zacharias' speechlessness, however, was only functional and temporary for this power was restored at the naming of the child. Perhaps the obnubilation of the linguistic faculty was symbolic or a counterpart of the hyperfunction of his son's future work of proclamation, as if more of this power than of others in the parent went over to the child. We are distinctly told, however, that there was no *asemia*. All we know of John too is true to the law that precocity is often a characteristic trait of those born of post-mature parents. Though but six months older than Jesus, he preceded him by a much longer period in his ministry. Again, age of parents and precocity tend to mono-ideism and perfervid dogmatic and perhaps narrow affirmations. Third, this power is subject to early decay and although John had heralded a new era, he had realized before Jesus came on the scene that he could not effect its consummation, so that we have clear notes not only of subordination but of waning power and anxiety lest his pioneering was to be left without an adequate sequel. Fourth, he was stern, uncompromising, and incapable of wielding the method of love, as Jesus could with his far greater strength of sentiment, which is characteristic of children of younger parents.

Thus the third synoptist makes here a real contribution not only well befitting his theme but peculiarly consonant with the best ideas of his age and race. In this domain he may have known rare facts such as often suggest still rarer and choicer fictions. Thus at the outset we must understand that there is a sense in which real art is always truer than history. We have here a worthy proem to the world's grandest epos. We see how always and especially in this circle and in these days of

fervid Messianic hope, parents yearned often inutterably for offspring, and how religious ecstasy may unseal the closed springs of life. A child thus conceived was from the Lord and of course must be a prophet. If the angel was a vision, the question whether the account is all fact or fiction, natural or supernatural, is therefore in each item only one of degree.

Six months later the same angel appeared to the betrothed Virgin Mary, announcing that the holy spirit should come over her, that she should bear a son to be called the son of God, calming her fear and felicitating her upon what Jesus was to be and do, and thereafter she was found with child. Joseph finding her condition was minded to put her away privately, but obeyed a dream-angel who commanded him to take her to wife, told him that the child was conceived of the Holy Ghost and would be Jesus, man's saviour from sins, and this he did, but "knew her not." Even if the angelic visit was not a veiled account of the conception itself, as the church and art have always assumed it to be, but only preparatory to it, this by no means opens the way to such baseless conceptions as that of Storfer³ that Mary was or became a temple hetera or vestal, and was rescued by Joseph, for there is no scintilla of evidence that there was any such custom then and there. Nor is it meant to be a record of true parthogenesis but the unequivocal meaning is that Yahveh himself for this one time became a father by an earthly bride, chosen out from among all women, as he had chosen the Hebrews from all races. As his only love she was thus the unique point of contact between heaven and earth, was not only the crown of womanhood but the most sacrosanct of all human beings, the supreme embodiment of "*das ewige weibliche*," combining like no other all the charms of virginity and maternity. Thus it was not strange that belief in the divine paternity of Jesus was generally current in the church from Ignatius early in the second century down. Tradition, independent of scripture, and more paramount over it in authority the farther back we go, soon came to regard this as a miracle in some sense complementing the resurrection. It appeared in the baptismal formula from which the first creed developed. Apocryphal literature amplified it, and even ascribed

³ Das jungfrauliche Mutterschaft. Berlin, 1914. Pp. 204.

to Mary herself a supernatural birth. Duns Scotus affirmed that she must have been especially sanctified in the womb and finally in 1854 Pope Pius the Ninth promulgated the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of Mary herself, all this by a not only natural but inevitable psychogenetic sequence. Thus the Holy Mother although she bore children later to her human husband, was made semi-divine, and so Jesus' humanity was reduced from one-half to one-fourth.

Although we know nothing of Mary's line of descent, we are strangely given two pedigrees of Joseph, one ascendant and one descendant, in order to show that through him Jesus was a true son of David, as prophecy had declared the Messiah must be. Matthew gives three symmetrical series of fourteen generations each, back to Abraham. This was meant primarily for Jewish Christians. Luke's genealogy of Joseph contains five times fourteen plus seven generations and goes back to Adam, the "son of God," the father of all men, and was calculated to appeal to all Gentiles. It agrees with Matthew in fifteen names but departs from him in forty. The one register has fourteen generations more between Jesus and David than the other. The compiler of both these lists of forbears obviously held that Jesus was the son of Joseph. In both there are but few generations back to the very first fiat son of God by creation, Adam, a prototype of Jesus, God's son by generation. The inclusion of these tables in the two gospels that also record Jesus' divine paternity suggests that they took shape at a time when both the natural and the supernatural view of Jesus' origin were permissible.

Pagan legends more than Jewish abound in virgin births to divine fathers. Queen Maya, the mother of Buddha, was impregnated in a dream. Protagoras and Plato, and later Scipio and Augustus were sons of Apollo, and Alexander the Great of Zeus. All the kings of Egypt, to the last of the Ptolemies, were divine incarnations, with at least one celestial parent, and throughout antiquity and among all primitive people legends of demigods abound.⁴ The folk soul is always and everywhere

⁴ See among the copious literature on this subject Pfeleiderer: *Early Christian conception of Jesus*. 1905. Pp. 1-48. Also his fuller *Urchristentum, seine Schriften und Lehrer*, 1902, 2d ed. Also J. M. Robertson, *Christianity and Mythology*, 1910, especially p. 292 et seq.

disposed to ascribe supernal parenthood to great men. Especially in pre-cultural times eminence was more readily conceived as born rather than made. Some great deities, like Demeter, bore not only children but grain, trees and fruit. Fertilization may be caused by the sun, wind, by eating various things, by shadow, a breath, a wish, standing on a holy spot, etc. Fatherlessness is sometimes suggestive of matriarchal ideas, a form of primitive feminism. Often, too, the father alone brought forth motherless *Wunderkinder*. Of old it was not known that geniuses are nearly as liable to be born as sports in one stratum of society as in another. Thus the doctrine of Jesus' divine fatherhood was far more prepared for and more readily received among the Gentiles than among the Jews. Luke's story is the most simple and chastened as well as the most clearly motivated perhaps of all the mass of mythological material upon this theme, and hence has most verisimilitude. Thus it is easier to accept his highly typified rendering of this theme than any other and this itself means much.

Here it must be premised that the psychology of Jesus is not chiefly concerned with questions of historicity. Its prime problem is *how man came to believe* the things of Christianity. If we grant that all the facts occurred literally as reported, the problem of psychology is to explain why man accepted and clung so tenaciously to them, surds though they seemed. If they did not occur, our problem is only how man came to invent as well as develop the will to believe and so fondly cherished them. In the latter case the psychic motivation is the same as in the former, only stronger. No student of religion to-day would reject all not proven to be factual as worthless or as *eo ipso* of inferior value to history, as Strauss and his followers did before genetic and analytic psychology and the work and ways of the folk soul were known. There is a sense in which, just as art improves on and brings out the inner meaning of nature and life, and is thus truer than they, so religion transfigures events by showing forth their moral soul. The effort to show this forth should therefore appeal to those of all creeds as well as of none. It is a characteristic of religious happenings that they have a higher symbolic value above and beyond their historic actuality with which criticism and diplomatology deal. It is therefore no sophistication of mysteries to say that

there are many things that are so eternally true that sometimes the question whether they did occur here or there is a matter of relative indifference. This must constantly be borne in mind, in considering the entire story of Jesus from the psychological point of view, and thus its psychology is at all points constructive and not destructive.

If the annunciation was not a veiled account of the conception itself but only predictive of it, then the latter must have been a spiritual and not a spermatie quickening of the ovum, and the act of fertilization was not by the ordinary channels and thus its biological significance is lost and its historic value impaired. In the closest of all pagan parallels, the myth ritual on the walls of the Temple of Luxor, the Isis-headed Toth, logos and messenger of the gods, first announces to the maiden queen, Mautmes, that she will bear a son. In the next scene the holy spirit or the Egyptian paraetele, Knopf, holds to her mouth the *crux ansata*, symbol of life, and thus she is spiritually impregnated by the god Amun-ra; then comes the birth, the adoration, etc. On this view the actual infaire or epithalamium in Mary's case is left to the imagination, perhaps as too secretly sacred for record, so that we have here a hiatus. To ask, as some have done, whether there were really spermatozoa, is idle as a medical, important though it be as a theological question, for otherwise the divine paternity remains more or less symbolic with some impairment of the whole process of incarnation.

Back of and reinforcing all such cases of the mating of divine and human beings lies a deep and rank phallic stratum bottoming on cosmogonies wherein Mother Earth or the primal abyss is impregnated by rain, lightning, wind or heaven itself personified, for celestial powers are masculine. Unions of above and below often typify those of the transcendent and immanent, and sometimes later of the conscious and the unconscious or the soul of the race and the individual, all of which unions are often typified by conjugation. There was a time when sex fashioned the apperceptive organs for most of the phenomena of nature and when ritual copulation between pairs, one of which represented a high and the other a lower power, was thought to quicken all the fertilizing and germinant energies of nature and to be true sympathetic magic. Thus gods came to earth and left seed with the daughters of men, and rain, clouds and wind had

special inseminating efficiency. That psychic vestiges of this long but slowly suppressed cult and type of folk thought persisted as unconscious attitudes and predispositions to believe the chastened story of Jesus' origin, no psychogeneticist or analyst can doubt, nor that the often otherwise unaccountable rancor of modern skepticism against the "conceived by the Holy Ghost" phrase of the creed is reinforced by the momentum of efforts of ages to repress phallicism.

Children and pubescents very often, especially if they are of humble parentage and feel themselves gifted, begin to wonder if, with all their amazing uprush of youthful insights and aspirations, they can really be the offspring of their prosaic parents. They at least daydream that they are supposititious and perhaps of royal descent. Sometimes this propensity prompts aversion to the real parents, and such children may leave home in quest of surroundings more befitting what they have conceived for themselves or to find the social milieu to which their lineage entitles them. On this topic we have now quite a literature of both morbid and normal cases. When Jesus, at the age of twelve, eluded his parents and was found by them in the temple and reproached his mother for not wotting that he must be about his father's business, he could not have meant carpentering. This response was tantamount to a disavowal of Joseph's parenthood. From a consciousness of his precocious insight into scripture and the elation that would come from his discussion with the scholars of the temple he was already on the way to a sense of divine sonship. That this was not yet complete is indicated by the eighteen further years of subjection and obscurity. Nowhere, however, in all his ministry is there any scintilla of anything that indicates filial respect to Joseph such as the Jews insisted on to parents. From this the inference is clear to the psychologist that early in life Jesus was averse to his putative father, not because of any envious Freudian wish to take his place in the mother's affection, but because he felt the characteristic sense, so common in ephebes, of being superior to at least one parent. He already felt himself to have been sired by a more exalted personage. Reveries of this kind and the reflections which they cause concerning mothers too have in many a modern instance motivated coolness to and aloofness from them such as Jesus repeatedly is said to have given signs

of. The point here is that such an experience in his own soul may have contributed thus early one factor to the complex that had already begun its evolution in his consciousness and that developed decades later among the early Christians that no less than God himself was his father. Thus as a child he practically disowned Joseph. If the latter was not a myth as many scholars now think (so numerous are the pagan parallels to his function here), and if he was really an old man, as tradition makes him, stern and unsympathetic with Jesus' youthful aspirations, the latter's conviction that he was really apart from and above the other members of his family may have thus early begun to pervade Jesus' thought and conduct, and also to work suggestively in the minds of those who knew what was going on in his soul. This trend in the most intimate circle of the youthful Jesus thus helped to prepare the soil of tradition for the later full acceptance of the doctrine of complete sonship of God. Certainly Joseph nowhere appears as the father such a child should have.

During his public ministry Jesus seems, as we shall later see, to have gradually attained a conviction that was ineluctable that he was the only begotten of God. He showed elation when Peter declared him to be the son of the living God, told his disciples that he was from above and they from beneath, that he came from and would return to his heavenly father. His supreme achievement of rising from the dead which years before any of the gospels were written Paul made the chief thing he did, and the center of all his own preaching, was what chiefly documented him as infallibly the true son of the true God. At first he was thought to have achieved sonship or to have been raised to it by adoption or possibly, as among some of the heretical sects, by apotheosis. Another later more Alexandrian doctrine was that he pre-existed as *logos* with God from the beginning. These two views were, however, very happily combined in the Lucan conception of a literal, physical generation. This later view therefore sought to reconcile the other two. Hence the doctrine of Jesus' supernatural conception met a very urgent doctrinal need, for something like it in the decades immediately following Jesus' death became a logical necessity. It gave a completeness to the whole theory of Jesus' nature and

work which it would otherwise have lacked. It did not merely supplement reasoned thought like Plato's myths but was in some sense the combining capstone of the theanthropic system. It materialized not merely a metaphor but an idea and extended the divine strain of heredity back from Jesus' later public years to the very beginning, or the amphimixis stage of his life, thereby also incidentally fertilizing the imagination of those within the pale of its influence to seek to fill out the entire unknown period of his career, particularly his infancy and childhood, with very many apocryphal fabrications which, had he been thought to have achieved sonship only in his later years, would have remained as unknown and uninteresting as it had been before this belief prevailed.

Besides the exigencies of theory, Jesusism began with a belief in the death and resurrection, the *punctum saliens* of all. Paul taught and seems to have known almost nothing of Jesus save that he died and rose, and has very little to say of his life or even his teachings. The conviction that he died as a propitiation for sin and rose and ascended, if it did not originate, chiefly promoted the interest in his previous life and motivated the composition of the first three gospels. All that was impressive in Jesus' personality, life and doctrine thus came to supplement and increase the prime impressiveness of his ultimate fate. Together these two traits made a seiche or tidal wave that surged backward until it transfigured the very origin of his life. Belief in this marvel is thus a most eloquent monument of the impression which the Pauline plus the Petrine Jesus came to have in the very early Christian consciousness. Belief in his supernal conception was a kind of *summa cum laude* degree which the Semitic folk-soul reserved for its supreme hero, a testimonial of what they thought and felt about him. So far as they, breeders of flocks and herds as they were, realized the biological difficulties of such a belief, assent to it was a euphorious *credo quia absurdum*, a voluntary offering up of reason to faith, which is the assent of man's deeper, larger and unconscious racial soul. What a hold it still has upon the heart, even in these days of science with its sense of the universality of law, is shown by the countless efforts of orthodoxy to conserve the vestiges of it whether by partial concessions to the *Zeitgeist*,

by allegorical and symbolic explanations, or by affirming it as a postulate of practical reason pragmatically justifiable because it has worked so well, or by vociferating it as a mystery which the will must compel us to believe—all of which is far better than the smug complacency of religious half-culture which sees nothing in it but a worthless and outgrown superstition.

Again, Luke's story is an amazingly pure and sublimated account of the act of begetting, so prominent and often crass in the Pentateuch. Still more is it in contrast with the gross phallic cults of the Canaanites and the sex corruption of the people among whom the new faith was first proclaimed. It was animated by the spirit of the then new celibacy at its best incipient moment, when chastity was beginning its great work of setting a backfire to the lewdness of the age. The salutation hail, health or wholeness invokes the condition precedent to all human achievement and is the universal form of greeting throughout the world. There is naturally virginal hesitation but no trace of modern parturition phobia. If degradation of this function to an orgy marks man as a sinful fallen creature we have here its progressive long-circuiting till in the place of marital rights exercised by gods or their representatives in the *jus primae noctis*, it is exalted to a type of the union of the church as the bride with the heavenly bridegroom. The erogenic impulse that serves the species is here spiritualized until instead of the hedonic narcosis there is only the desire to produce the type, totemic, heavenly man, the long awaited Messiah, redeemer, saviour. If the ecstasy of love gives life a higher value because it first teaches what real pleasure is, and thus makes goodness understood, it is the passion for noble offspring that makes it a sacrament in which each partner is in place of the divine to the other and every conception immaculate. But there is no physical or even psychic ecstasy. Asceticism has suggested nothing colder, for the submission and consent are hardly more than mechanical. Some think, as we saw, that Luke designs in this scene to describe only a preparatory dream or trance, a kind of license to wedlock direct from heaven, superseding human ceremonials and certification, but perhaps justifiable by the prevailing Messianic expectation. It has been suggested that this hope pervaded the souls of every maiden in the circle

from which Jesus sprang with a force inversely as her realization of the percentile number of chances that the lot of divine motherhood might fall to her, or directly as her sense of individual fitness for this function. Romantic love in any modern sense, deep and perennial though its wellsprings have always been, had little literary development among the ancient Hebrews save so far as in their minds it was always religious. No race so fused love and piety as we see in the song of Solomon. As the Greeks and Romans idealized it in pastoral life and amid sylvan scenes with perhaps Pan, satyrs and fauns, so the Semitic mind was prone to give it a celestial interpretation colored with reminiscences of the ancient promise to Abraham. Even if it was first a legend doomed to pass into the service of dogma, it may have been lived out as a fact in Mary's subjective experience. Belief in it, whether as fact or fiction, may have been more or less euhemeristic, and its use for purposes of race pedagogy may have been at first with some consciousness of apocryphal fabrication. In any case the artist had a hard task. We do not know how much of the mythic material of his age was at his command, but especially among a race so pure the character of Mary must not only be preserved from all possible suspicion but exalted. A race of herdsmen would not be predisposed to believe in a birth that eliminates human male parentage. Joseph too had to be made both content and continent, while Mary's consent would not only jeopardize her spouse's love but involve risks of aspersion and perhaps humiliation.

Over against the above view that Jesus' life was so tremendously impressive that the inference of a supernatural birth was inevitable and irresistible, is the skeptic argument that his deeds and words were felt to be insufficient in themselves, and hence were in need of the glamor which this kind of accrediting gave; it was necessary to glorify a career that without it would have been more or less inglorious; it was an *ab extra* certification *ad majorem gloriam vitae Jesu*. This motive was involved in many of the pagan deifications, as in the case notoriously of the weaker and baser later Roman emperors. Christian apologists have used it to confirm lapsing faith in Jesus, so that belief in it has in many cases been a product of defect and not

of excess of faith. This, however, is a question of history and that it was not the case with Luke or the early Christians has been abundantly shown.⁵

Here it was a tribute to a great life, a choice of the least of two miracles, divinification at some later point of his life, or else at its very source. Conception by the spirit of truth was less miraculous than any other explanation of the wondrous light that broke forth from him in maturity. It had to be believed quite apart from its objective reality. Had the birth legend contravened a less universal law, its cogency as an argument and its value as a tribute to Jesus' greatness would have been less than as it now stands. If we can conceive it as an actual fact, proved or provable by all the tests that modern science could suggest, its significance would be isolated and its worth impaired.

Again, had he been what he was by nurture rather than by nature, had he been made rather than born great, the developmental schema of his life would have been less spontaneous, aboriginal, indigenous. By this token, his qualities were due to preformation rather than epigenesis. Had he been a great pundit or rabbi, his mind charged with the ideas of others instead of filled with his own (as Plato reproached Aristotle with getting his thoughts through reading rather than from inspiration by inner oracles), he would have been less divine for acquired possessions are less assimilated or less a part of ourselves than those that are innate. His trust in his own originality was so great that he yielded to its suggestions with abandon, and this from-within-outward trait of supreme genius points to a hereditary source.

So too does the fact of his uniquely orthogenic life. Conversions involve drastic upheavals, storm and stress, a new direction, and therefore loss of more or less of the original momentum, as we see in cases of the Paul or Augustine type. Regeneration involves some break with the past, the graft of a new

⁵ See best of all Allan Hoben's compilation of data and authorities of the anti-Nicene period. Lobstein, "The Virgin Birth of Christ," tr., N. Y., 1903, only shows in a ponderously judicial way that this belief was "a myth created by popular devotion," that it "ceases to remain a real fact but stands out as a characteristic creation of the faith of the church," that it is a symbol we must lay bare, etc.

stock upon an old one, a fresh start with abandonment of some lines or acquisitions. It is not a mere acceleration such as we see at normal adolescence but there is more or less of a rupture that suggests the invasion of an alien principle or a sudden irruption of God into the soul. Saving though this be, it involves the loss of impulsion for something old must be sloughed off and life must be built over again more or less and on a new plan. Had Jesus been a converted sinner, as Schrempf and others have urged, as we shall see later, and especially had the change come over him just before his public ministry, his life would have lacked unity, his evolution would not have been rectilinear. Had he served a long apprenticeship to learning, his birth and heredity would have tended to shrivel toward insignificance, because instead of his origin his regeneration by learning would have been the point of cardinal interest, and what had preceded might have been left to oblivion. God would thus have been in some sense the father of his subsequent life only. But for a type of life which all outer biographic incidents cannot explain, and where the primordial impulsion is all, the problem of its source becomes urgent just in proportion as the mature life and its effects unfold into ever greater significance. The record indicates that Jesus never referred to any early pivotal experience, nor did he contrast his early with his later life. His own reticence and that of those who knew him best concerning the first three decades of his life is singular. Perhaps he lacked autobiographic interest because he was so intent upon his father's business here and now that he had not time or energy to be reminiscent, which would be flight from reality in the sense of Janet and Freud. Perhaps he had so completely digested his past that all its lessons had been made over into forms of impulsion to advance his mission. Perhaps he had grown so fast that he felt the past life far behind. His early experience had consisted in pressing rapidly upward through all the characteristic experiences of humanity, and only when he emerged above the common lot of man into Desjardin's "phenomena of altitude" did his life have unique superhuman meaning. On this view the years of apprenticeship did not count but only those above the range of common humanity. Perhaps others had gone as far as he had before the advent of John and he may have felt that had he died then or before he

would have added nothing intrinsically either new or valuable to the world. Many thus hold that it was at this point that he transcended and became superman in a unique sense. He looked toward the future even more intensely than he did toward the past because what was to come would eclipse all that had gone before. It was his present personality that had a value and told. Had he attained old age he might have fallen into its habit of reminiscence. Thus without touching here the mooted question whether Jesus passed through distinct developmental stages in his public ministry, his consciousness must have been penetrated to a unique degree with the sense of rapid development. The child does recapitulate the history of the race by leaps and bounds, living as it were millenia in hours and minutes. If we assume that Jesus' psychic development was exceptionally rapid in this sense, the inference to an exceptional divine initial momentum must have been inevitable.

There is no indication that Jesus was always consciously working over and interpreting on an ever higher plane the experiences of his childhood and youth, like Goethe, but the trajectory of his life was so steep and he conserved so uniquely the naïveté and rate of growth, rapidest in infants but which in others is progressively slowed down, as Minot has shown, that he never departed so far from the primitive *nisus generativus* as others do. This must thus have contributed its own quota of impulses to the construction and acceptance of the psychopedagogic masterpiece of the Lucan tale. If infancy is Wordsworthian or if we accept Freud's conception of the all-dominance of childish wishes, and if these influences were less abated in Jesus, whether or not he was conscious of their source or date, then he was peculiarly heaven-born in all that this metaphor can mean.

Thus, in fine, while if we could psychoanalyze the faith of those who at first or now affirm this belief perhaps no Christian would be found who held to it in the sense orthodoxy assumes (and certainly belief in its literalness would not meet the criteria a modern psychology would test it by), nevertheless its truth so far transcends historicity that the psychologist of the folk soul can say, summing all the above trends, with a fullness of conviction that criticism can never give, and that

the old faith never knew, that Jesus was veritably "conceived by the Holy Ghost and born of the Virgin Mary."

This belief shows forth the dual nature of Jesus as God and man, and therefore as fit to be a mediator between the two. Even if we interpret God as humanity generally, as over against the individual with Feuerbach, or if we regard God as the phylogenetic and the individual as the ontogenetic element in the human species, or God as the unconscious and man as the conscious component, all is not lost but a new and pregnant suggestiveness is brought to light. This doctrine too, when supplemented by the exaltation of Mary, to be "mother of God," expressed the sinlessness ascribed to Jesus, rectifying the fall of man through Eve, and made Jesus the founder of a new race higher than all the sons of the first Adam. Even Sanday,⁶ obsessed as he is by the classic credal view, falteringly suggests that the divine element in Jesus' theanthropic soul may have been not unlike the subliminal self. Who that is intuitive, ingenuous and spontaneous, in bringing himself to bear with all his resources upon some theme or cause, has not had the experience of feeling himself caught up or swept along (or occasionally restrained like Socrates) by a higher power which he felt to be not himself, but which we now interpret as the soul of the race breaking into that of the individual? This complex of submerged constellations, which man has always been prone to conceive as superhuman, divine or demonic possession, the afflatus or inspiration of a muse, or a revelation from on high, Jesus interpreted as his sonship. Holtzmann, Baumann and other recent christologists have emphasized as a chief trait in Jesus' life and character that instead of being occasionally dominated by this higher self he was almost continuously so, that in a word he was nearly always a trifle ecstatic, exalted, erethic, or in a state of spiritual second breath. It was thus that he introduced a new, more normal type of consciousness, viz., one in which this generic social or racial element preponderated over and subordinated the ordinary hypertrophied selfish individuality. This it was that brought in a higher, saner unity of the soul, made it less liable to bifurcation or discord, more immune from wasteful disharmonies and most

⁶ Christologies, Ancient and Modern. New York, 1910.

forms of obsessions by the haunting sense of inferiority (Adler), which we now know to be so prolific of psychic disorders, so that the dangers of schizophrenia or the splitting up of the total soul of the individual into multiple personalities are vastly reduced. Every individual should be the organ, agent, manifestation, son of the species, incarnate it, come out from it, and having done his appointed work, return whence he came. Jesus alone did this ideally because he was the totemic man, and more than any other the typical embodiment of the race, the best unipersonal exemplar of the race idea, the true superman, the entelechy of what is good and best in the human phylum. Thus if we think of Jesus as race-man instead of God-man, the symbol-myth of his divine impregnation still has pneumatic meaning. If there were two wills in Jesus instead of one, as the Monothelites affirmed, the individual was completely subjected to the racial will, which was the core of his nature. The unique authoritativeness of Jesus' teaching ("It hath been said but verily I say unto you") and the breaks with current custom and opinion also mark the apartness, solitariness, loftiness of his genius, and suggest creative energy revealing itself in the very depths of his nature from a source as primordial as the beginning of life. In the comment of his friends about his parents and in the reproach that nothing good could come out of his early home or in his remark that a prophet is not without honor save in his own country, he recognized the proneness to seek in heredity the causes of all unwonted variations and also showed that he was on the way to a conviction (that Galton has shown to be false) that real greatness cannot have a humble origin.

Again, in the act of impregnation the race soul evicts and takes possession of that of the individual, and that is why these experiences stand out with such a dazzling transcendent light that there is a rupture of continuity with the before and after of experience, and a sense that we have something here that can never be expressed in its terms. This explains the fact that the hedonic narcosis is really indescribable so that amorists can only bode forth its raptures by inadequate tropes and symbols. It also explains why sometimes both man and woman, especially if neurotic, have often conceived that the partner's place was momentarily taken by some higher spiritual

personage, be it angel, demon or deity, or been in a twilight stage of consciousness most favorable to idealization. For describing the processes of the race soul or the superenergized life generally, we still have only crude phrases, metaphors and allegories. Here man is paraphasic and nearly all our thought forms concerning it are still borrowed either from sex or religion, which are always in such close sympathetic rapport with each other. Of old in the pinnacle moments of supreme affirmation of the will to live there often lurked in the background of the soul vestiges of the time when marital rights were thought to be exercised by the gods, as the reins of consciousness were handed over to the sympathetic system if not to the very biophores in the biological rejuvenation of fertilization. No individual editorship can thus ever adequately express the collective experience of man in any, and least of all in this, domain. It has suffused the world with a new joy and is the eternal basis not only of optimism but of all that is ideal and of the transcendental world.

This brings us to the most fundamental of all the many formative forces that shaped the nativity concept and gave it such a hold upon Christendom. To understand this we must pause for a very cursory glance at what might perhaps be called the psychogenesis of the transcendent, belief in which, though by no means identical with religion, is closely bound up with it. It springs from several roots and the first of these, with which it really begins, is animism, that ascribes psychic states more or less like our own to inanimate things and processes. This, as all know, attributes rudimentary sentiency to stones, weapons and every object, and postulates something that survives their destruction. More developed, it extends to forces of nature, streams, clouds, heavenly bodies. It is by its impulse that we assign souls to flowers, trees, and animals, and in a word, become anthropomorphic. This is, of course, quite distinct from idolatry which it always precedes, for this regards special objects as abodes or embodiments of spiritual beings. This propensity in the human soul prompts to nature worship and may issue in pantheism but the main point is it made dualism.

A second root of the religious consciousness is found in the difficulty the soul feels in accepting the great fact of death.

Primitive man saw his friends born, grow to maturity, and then in an instant they were transformed into a decomposing corpse, so that the momentum of habit impelled to the belief that something invisible survived independently of the body. Of course these early concepts of self were fantastic. It was named breath, wind, echo, shadow, image, cloud, eye, heart, butterfly, etc. The first ghosts were very tenuous, pallid, weak, unreal, and led a fitting existence, perhaps under the earth amid tombs or battle fields, or frequenting their old haunts by night, hovering about their relatives, occasionally seen and heard and in a limbo state, neither very sad nor joyous, neither very good nor bad, so that the life of the poorest man was preferable to theirs. Their number was sometimes pictured like that of the autumn leaves. They were perhaps herded by some stronger soul, living or dead, or drifted aimlessly, thickly populating some parts of space, seeking perhaps to revive their fading memories, or save themselves from being resolved back into nothingness by reincarnation. So strong is the impulse to believe in them that the opinion has been set forth with great learning that one of the chief objects of funeral rites was to bring home to the minds of survivors that their friends were really and completely dead, body and soul, that is, to lay their ghosts beyond the possibility of revenance, and free man from the bogs of crass spiritism and necromancing.⁷

It was of course a great epoch when the chaotic ghost world first began to be ordered and systematized. One of the most important stages in this development was the idea of associating pleasant posthumous states with previous merit, and painful ones with ill desert, thus giving man a universe in which virtue and happiness on the one hand, and wickedness and pain on the other, got together, as they do not in the world we know. Thus the growth of the conception of posthumous rewards and penalties was an immense gain for virtue, wherever the latter was rightly conceived, for the transcendental ghost world was idealized and was introduced as a great factor into human conduct, and then of course conceptions of hell and heaven were more and more elaborated.

When this transcendentalized motive is at its acme there are

⁷ See this point amplified in my article, *Thanatophobia and Immortality* *Am. Jr. Psychol.*, Oct., 1915.

uncounted legions or cycles of archangels, heavenly hosts or the great dead conversing on high themes at least in some boat-house on the Styx or guardian spirits guiding their favorites, or others that inspire, heal, obsess or blight man. There are embodied ideals of duty, wisdom, strength; gods become highly personified and heroes of mythopeic biographies, loaded down with symbolisms, always superior to man, but made on the same pattern, and so an immense culture power in the world. Especially the Hebrew, Greek and Teutonic mind definitized these deities and demigods which more or less filled the orders of existence from man upward, but the Oriental mind which was more prone to revel in temporal rather than in spatial expansion, preferred the doctrine of transmigration and even karma, a law to which all the worlds and Brahma himself is subject, according to which the soul of each individual is living out a single stage in a series of many and perhaps an infinite number of lives. The ethical element is of course effective for each reincarnation is up or down the scale of being according as the previous life was lived. Thus each man, animal or god has been his own creator and souls do not choose their own lives freely beforehand, as in Platonic myth, but are subject to the iron judgment of desert.⁸

⁸ Bastian in his various works would correlate this trend with conceptions of temporal extension of the life of superior elect ones who led an existence extraordinarily prolonged but continuous and not broken by the links of generations as in karma. The adept is more than a patriarch and must perfect his soul by labors, introversion, alchemy or what not till his life is more or less subtleized and rejuvenated, and he approaches the Mahatma stage in which he has gained all knowledge, can pass through space, leads a kind of charmed, magic, supernal existence, not longing for death like the wandering Jew nor translated like Enoch but residing in obscure places and teaching the few elite who seek and are able to find him. Sometimes in these views too there are hints of both pre- and post-existence. This great concept has its penates and its euhemerism and indeed this point and those above described may borrow features from one another.

Again, the transcendancy motif in a more generic form but in the same sense may crop out in the philosophemes of successive cycles or epochs. At the end of the world here all things return as they were. Perhaps everything is obliterated and a new start made, and every item of the preceding era repeated or, as other of the Stoics who were fond of this view thought, nothing is repeated. While the conception of infinite past time requires that every possible combination of the cosmic elements should

Now it is very hard for us to realize the immense significance of that great movement of the human spirit that at last culminated in the more evolved forms of polytheism or in monotheism. The latter particularly brought order into the chaos that had hitherto reigned in the domain of the Beyond and placed at the head of the universe not an Olympian who had won his throne by evicting an earlier dynasty of gods and was always in danger of attack, but one supreme being to whom all other powers and persons in the whole transcendental world were subordinated. This gave loftiness of soul and unity of mind, so that the noumenal world was never so real and its ethical power never so great.

In the above I have only sought to indicate in rough phrases the new standpoint of the genetic origin of the other world concept as if it in all its forms was in fact a product, eject, projection of the racial soul, working slowly and in the main unconsciously. There is of course no assumption whatever concerning the objective reality of God, heaven, souls, etc., but there is only insistence that quite apart from the problem of their existence is another and very distinct one, viz., that of the genesis of the conceptions of them. No matter here whether their *esse* is their *percipi* or not. It is only the latter that is here involved. It is even superfluous to raise the question whether back of this argument lies a fond unconscious hope or belief that the folk soul is so fecund that it would have engendered and extradited from itself this counter-world in just its present form, even if it had no existence save in human thought.

Now the organ with which this supernal world is known is called faith; the evidence of things not seen if not their very substance and reality. It is into such forms that the mighty energy of man's soul unfolds through the ages, so that there will always be a sense in which the divine will be the noblest creation of the soul of man because to accept a belief and to make and to create it are only different degrees of the same energy. This idealization of another world and the develop-

have been exhausted, the idea of an infinite number of parts require that they should never be exhausted and that everything that happens every moment should be absolutely new. The transcendence here is in the mechanism which controls this eternal recurrence or makes it impossible.

ment of a life here that consists of other world conduct, such as forms of worship, are of a realm of existence that supplements and is the counterpart of this, especially if it is one of which all the ordinary content of experience seems a promise and potency:—this explains why such beliefs lie so close and warm about the human heart and why they are often so clung to against evidence and even against interest. It is because they are necessary for the totalization of the soul, and so exactly fit the imagination that is the totalizing faculty by which man transcends his own limitations of time, space and personality towards the dimensions of the race, and thereby becomes a citizen of the universe which is henceforth no longer in any part a chaos but a cosmos.

This objectivization of man's racial soul first makes possible the supreme human tragedy of the amphibole between faith and sight, idealism and positivism, the spiritual and material view of the world. The true adjustment of the relations between the transcendent and the immanent, subordinated neither to the other, and using both aright, is perhaps the supremest of all the problems of higher race pedagogy or statesmanship such as the Semitic mind so persistently ascribed to Yahveh. In both the race and the individual we see the reciprocal relations between these two elements and each tends to be inversely as the other. When for instance the Jews were led captive or lost their fatherland they remembered God, recalled the promises, gathered and studied their sacred literature, but in prosperity they forgot Yahveh. When Rome was declining it seemed that the hope of the world that had centered for generations about its most marvelous political organization, was failing, and men slew themselves from a despair which perhaps but for Christianity would have become absolute. Thus the rankest superstitions sprang up, were accepted and cherished. Such excessive otherworldness always prompts mystic cults of many kinds, a gasping longing for modes of higher knowledge, a theo- and parousia-mania, ecstasy, trance, as we see in the Alexandrian philosophies, a longing for visions, revelations from on high; or the subordination may express itself in asceticism, self-abnegation, strenuous efforts at exiguous liturgical purity, and in every means of realizing and apprehending the supernal or penetrating the veil, and everywhere too the assumption that the other

world is inversely as this, that the blessing is for the poor in spirit, for those who suffer, that all sorrows and even tortures will be compensated by heavenly joys. If the old Jerusalem is destroyed the new one comes down from heaven. When the Greco-Roman civilization collapsed the new heavenly kingdom of the church appears in Christendom in Augustine's City of God, which is the transfiguration of the antique state idea. Sacrifice is the way of salvation.

Thus man is at once a citizen of two countries of very different constitutions. The religious consciousness has generally worked apart from the secular and works by different categories and has other rubrics. There are everywhere dual characters in which religion is separated by a watertight compartment from daily life. Their pathetic souls are torn by the conflict between faith and reason, or feel with Jacobi that there is a light in the heart that goes out when we carry it into the head. Among the English it was Hobbes who chiefly set the fashion, so conspicuously followed in that land, of keeping religion and rational activities entirely apart, and Newton and scores of more modern English and American thinkers have thus partitioned their souls.

It is still more pathetic to unduly subject one to the other and to force reason to capitulate to faith or to Rome by some immolating *credo quia absurdum*, positively bolting doctrines and cults as a way out of skepticism or postulating some extreme *solipsistic* idealism to escape agnosticism, putting documents where ideas should be, or conversely attempting to expel faith and idealism and to plant the feet solidly upon the earth of positivism or even materialism.

Now it is against one and all of these forms of double house-keeping that the theanthropic consciousness, of which Jesus' conception symbolizes the beginning, is at once a standing protest and a way of deliverance. This great and new insight is nevertheless very simple. It is the quintessence of genius to posit its own inmost thought as the truest thing in the world for all men. The great religious geniuses, like all the greatest reformers, have but two words in their vocabulary, now and here. So too science proclaims that all that ever was or will be is now. Prophecy is fulfilled, ideals realized, not merely in some remote time and place but in our day, land and souls.

That was the note struck as we shall see by the preaching of the Baptist which acted like an alarum and it is also the key to all the work of Jesus. God, the kingdom, judgment, are here and now. The transcendant is no longer to remain where Jewish formalism, tradition or later patristic metaphysics tended to banish it, at some remote point, but all promises are fulfilled now, so that human consciousness can again become homogeneous and unitary. The transcendant world never drifted so far from the immanent as in Jesus' day and to reunite them was his great achievement. The divine siring of a God-man could not have occurred in any such sense where pantheism prevailed, because divine incarnations come to consciousness in all souls. Nor could it have occurred in the domain of polytheism because heroes, leaders and gods have others beside them. But in Jesus and his circle the Jewish monotheistic idea had culminated and his great work was the realization that the one supreme God is also in all we can ever hope to know of him realized in the highest and most human of souls; that henceforth this reciprocal relation between transcendence and immanence is at an end and that in Jesus' nature, way back and down to his birth as well as in his adult consciousness, there was perfect harmony and atonement and the plain and solid establishment of both the basis and method of complete unity between all that the most romantic faith and all science can ever truly attain.

Still further, as the Semitic and Hellenic cultures, independent at first, mingled later in the way Hatch, Zellar and others have shown, fertilizing each other, it was from their union that the new religious consciousness arose, which was so radically different from either of them but which later came to wield the accumulated resources of Christendom. It would be wrong to represent the Jewish mind with its theocratic principle as the full type of the transcendant, or the Greeks with their love of the sense world and their worship of beauty as a complete type of the immanent mind. It is sufficient to note in them the predominance of these tendencies respectively. We must therefore postulate something like a native Greek element in the mind of Jesus and realize that in his consciousness the best of each of these ethnic cultures entered.

Also, just as the fertilized ovum becomes not only quick and

growing instead of inert as before, but is a more complex and complete unity, so the union of the hither and yonder world in the new sense of immanent deity, which Christianity brought, was the *punctum saliens* of all. It was not only mediation but atonement and salvation. Thus again we see that it was a sound and most genial instinct that placed the germ of this new standpoint in the impregnation itself, so that this consummate religious genius in whose life is found the vital node of the highest religion, is given by Luke a *point de repère* which places him and his wondrous postulate in just the right position between God and man at the start as more born than made. In him the Socratic sentiment that no evil could befall a good man, living or dead, which Leo Haas and Dr. Gompers have made the basis of a neo-Socratic ethics and even of an ideal community of paidia or free joyous activity, to be attained by three distinct paths, developed into a sense of trust in a heavenly parent. By just so many parts as Jesus felt himself divine the transcendant became immanent and the immanent became transcendant, so that the chasm that had come to yawn between things earthly and things extramundane was bridged and a new set of apperceptive centers given, around which were to be readjusted all the facts and interests of human life.

This union left two residual forms of ethnic consciousness behind, out of which it took the life, so that they were deciduous. As their later history shows, their ultimate fate was like that of the polar globules or chromosomes which after the union of the sperm and germ cell are extruded from the impregnated ovum. On the one hand the Jewish mind went on to ever greater refinements of literalism, textual symbolism, allegorical exegesis, extending to numbers, form, positions of letters in Talmud, Targum and Masoretic rules, and in liturgical and ceremonial purity, the one as exiguous as the other was tortuous. On the other hand Greek thought in Philo, Plotinus and Proclus lost itself in striving to retrace the steps by which the soul emanated down through the enneads from some supersensible source. The real world was felt to be in a low, almost duncy state of alienation, estrangement or heterization. Although *nous* was the very first emanation, an ectype of the divine, the lapse had gone so far that it was desperately hard to get from the world of common experience to a divine reality

or from it to us. Thus the only mediation the Alexandrians knew was for the soul as product to turn again to its origin and seek mystic absorption as in trance-like states with the navel-gazing in silentaries.

In view of all the above, have not both the church and the higher critics laid too much stress upon the literal physical historicity of the divine sonship of Jesus? Suppose faith in it as a biological marvel wanes. We can conserve its essential truth by conceiving Luke as an inspired creative genius who felt the various trends and verities characterized above, and as the inspired oracle of them invented his narrative which will forever remain a psychopedagogic marvel of the *bien trouvé*. But for him there would have been a lost chord, an unfinished window in the Aladdin palace of the system of Jesusism.

In all times, places and ranks, pregnancy has had special social and hygienic treatment and regard. Gravid women are prescient and often prophetesses, and their very whims and picae are perhaps commands. They are often isolated or subjected to perverted regimens, exempted from many usual duties, and there are endless superstitions concerning the effects of diet, the susceptibility of both mother and unborn child. There are many magic rites as well as horoscopes, presents, visits and predictions. In this field Luke ventures to give us only a very brief sketch of the old and the young mother together in high converse in a hill country. The feature he stresses is exultation and save for the possible interpolation of Elizabeth's query, "Why the mother of my Lord should come to me" and the phrase in Mary's magnificat, "Henceforth all generations shall call me blessed" his sketch is artistically well tempered and proportioned. For the rest the seclusion is so effective as to reveal nothing even to the scholar. The deep hunger of the soul of both expectant mothers is satisfied and the loftiest possible conception of the future of both children is freely indulged in. It is all the work of the Lord, to whom praise and thanksgiving are rendered. The salutation of Mary brings the first "quickening" of the unborn in the senescent woman, an experience which is the focus of much folk lore and custom, but is here prelude of John's later relation to Jesus. The heart of Mary overflows with an euphorious sense of triumph

and gratitude for God's power and goodness as manifested in her condition. Although herself of low estate, she exults that she is chosen to bring boundless blessing to her people. Strange to say, we have no intensive study of the unique psychic state of normal women during the incubation period, but Luke's depiction of it as exultant and focused on the career of the future child is an ideal paradigm of what should be as delicate as it is bold and creative. The prenatal stage of life is now recognized as too significant to be omitted from any complete biography. If there was none of Ferenczi's sense of *Allmacht* in the embryo, unless in the case of that of the leaping John, it finds ecstâtic expression in Mary. The narrative of the poet physician evangelist almost suggests the Hippocratic sentence, "Godlike is the physician who is also a philosopher." Genial as this is, there is nothing marvelous or impossible about it. Its perpetual moral to modern mothers is, retire with an older woman in the same condition into the country. Give your imagination free scope to abandon itself to daydreams of what you hope your offspring will be and do in the world, for possibly your crudest wish will not be without prenatal influence. We cannot be too thankful that our author did not indulge in any of the weird or monstrous fancies of the Oriental or even of the Greek polytheistic mind in treating this period of their heroes or demigods. Luke seems to have had here no dogmatic purpose but sought merely to show that Jesus' prenatal stage was passed under the most favorable conditions and perhaps also that his own clairvoyance later was presaged by the state of his mother, for Jesus' whole career was in a sense a magnificat of the Lord. In John's birth the relatives come with festive awe. The father ratified the mother's wish that the child should not bear his name, and having written this on the eighth day at circumcision Zacharias' tongue was loosed and he was filled with the spirit and glorified God who had accomplished his prophecies to Israel, and apostrophized the child as bringing light and salvation, all in eloquent rhapsodic terms. It was a fulfillment of the old covenant of redemption from enemies, a more complete service, and the promulgation from on high of a new way of peace. It was the beatitude of a venerable priest wreaking his soul in expressing its sentiments at the moment of being suddenly freed by a great joy

from the repression of nine months of mutism, and all this was a most natural if exceptional ebullition. Primitive races prescribe jubilation, offerings, set speeches of recognition and welcome to the newcomer, and precautions against the evil eye, demons, and other malific influences (Ploss: *Das Kind*, Bd. 1, S. 49-145). Here the dominant note, in which all others are merged, is grateful joy.

Six months later Joseph had to journey with his gravid wife to Bethlehem to be taxed, and there, because the inn was full, she bore her child and used a manger for its cradle. By night shepherds nearby saw the glory of the Lord like that which appeared of old when the tabernacle was builded in the wilderness, and an angel announced the Saviour's birth and told them how to find him, and a Gloria by a heavenly choir followed. They came, adored, proclaimed the glad tidings, and glorified God. Jesus on the eighth day was named, circumcised, and brought to Jerusalem, where a poor man's sacrifice of turtle doves and pigeons was offered.

The nativity, which has hallowed all the Christmas season, with which the association of the resurrection at Easter is the chief other Christian festival, singularly barren of details as the record is, has been extravagantly amplified in apocryphal legend and has always been a favorite theme of art and pious meditation. Its setting is pastoral and bucolic and makes Jesus in a sense homeless. Critics have thought that the journey is insufficiently motivated and even inconsiderate of Mary's condition, and have suspected its veracity because the note of fulfilling prophecy was too dominant. But if the symbolism of the place and circumstances of the birth itself is meagre (and Luke here falls far below the possibilities that his theme should inspire), he has not failed to stress the cardinal point that at the nativity heaven and earth came together. This he represents in the apparition to the shepherds to whom is first supernaturally revealed all the gospel that there then was, viz., that at last a divine child was born. Not the great or the rulers even of the synagogue but humble herdsmen first heard this gladdest of all glad tidings, as if in token that the lowly should be exalted. It is idle to attempt to explain this vision upon natural or psychological grounds for it was collective. It seems more like an individual invention of poetic

license than a legend, is doubtless more allegory than history, and it suggests that Luke may here have been touched by the old-fashioned *afflatus* of the prophets. Mary brought forth among the kine, the herdsmen first knew and acclaimed the future Lord. There was no accoucheur or nurse save nature, and none was needed. There was no concourse of friends or relatives as at John's birth. Its very simplicity and secrecy were perhaps meant to enhance the impression of its sacredness. Parents and child—they three were alone with God and his dumb, domesticated creatures, but the high heavens knew it and responded with a marvelous effulgence, celestial music and angelic apparition, showing how the world above was now in new and sympathetic rapport with earth and its children. As Mary's psychophysic organism was the best nidus for the unique life that was to realize all the higher possibilities of humanity, so earth itself was beatified and crepitated with rapture as in the old days when heaven itself was procreative on mother earth, which here rejoices to receive its celestial lord. To explain how the shepherds knew, expositors and apologists have evoked telepathy and kinship, secret but undiscovered sources of information, and tense expectancy ready to pass at a touch of fancy or of any fancied stimulation from a state of hope to one of belief. An aurora in the cold Christmas sky and a subjective aura involving optical and aural centers with a flush of suffusing transport, have been conjectured, but the whole narrative is really more suggestive of dream life or even of literary imagination than of any well known laws of meteorology. But the psychic atmosphere at least was tense to the discharging point.

Only Luke, the paidologist of the New Testament, gives us the idyll of Simeon, very aged, devout, expectant, waiting for some visible embodiment of the hope and promise of his heart, and dying content with the newborn infant. This embodied symbol of the great expectation is another cradle song of moving pathos. Greek and especially Platonic friendship at its best was between mature men and adolescent boys, but here extreme age and infancy are brought into contact and death is given perhaps its most natural consolation by the sight of a new life with which it has just time to make contact and to which blessing may be transmitted. Thus souls full of grandparenthood nor-

mally wait with joy and expectancy for an object which the soul that strains with tension into the future can clasp. Thus too the infant is made to inherit the hope of a venerable saint in Israel who facing death rejoices at the glimpse of a new life in which all his own unfulfilled expectations as well as those of his forbears are to be realized, and all of which therefore seem much nearer. No crucifix, ceremonial, rite, song or act of worship is more satisfying to dying eyes than that object which is more worthy of love, reverence and service than any other in the world, a newborn child.

The prophetess Anna at the age of eighty-four who had fasted and prayed in the temple ever since she was left a young widow, saw the babe by chance in her ministrations and gave thanks and spoke of him to all who awaited consolation. The irradiation also widened toward the east and Oriental wisdom, impersonated by the magi, followed a new star such as many a myth describes as appearing at the birth of those destined for greatness. Some think we have here in adumbrated form some hint of how Luke's story came to be attracted into so many points of resemblance to that of the early life of Buddha.⁹

⁹ In the *Lalita Vistara* the life of Buddha is said to have begun in heaven, where he is described as instructing the other gods and telling them he proposes to descend and be born of a virgin as a man. Despite the protests of his fellow deities, having appointed and installed a successor he proceeded to earth. In the *Clementine Homilies* the heavenly Jesus first became man in Adam, then in Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses; and other incarnations are to be expected. This gnostic view is very Oriental. So Buddha had experienced many incarnations but his passion for this one was that it was to be the last. His mother, Queen Maya, withdrew from her husband to be for a time, an ascetic, and when in a dream she saw a white elephant enter her body, she knew that she would bear a son who would be mighty, perfect and a saviour. When he was born, he cried with the voice of a lion, "I am the noblest and best thing in the world. This is my last birth. I will put an end to birth, old age, sickness and death." Then the earth quaked, heavenly music was heard, supernal light filled all the worlds, all creation was in ecstasy, pain ceased, the poor became rich, the bond free, the sick well, etc. Then came hosts of heavenly deities and offered homage and gifts of spices, garments and song. There then lived a great seer, Asita, who saw the signs in heaven, and coming to the city, entered the palace and saw the infant Buddha with all the thirty-two signs of greatness. He then sighed and wept because he was old and feeble and therefore could not profit by the teachings of the new sage. A parallel is also found to Jesus' visit to

Warned again by a dream, Joseph fled with mother and child to Egypt to escape the machinations of Herod, who soon after slew all the children of two and under in and near Bethlehem. This wholesale slaughter destroyed those who would naturally have been Jesus' playmates had that been his boyhood home, and made him more solitary and unique, for his mates would be either older or younger than himself, or perhaps girls. The assumption that this cruel monarch was in the state of superstitious terror of an infant accomplished five things, viz., it represented the Messianic expectation as so prevalent and strong that this alien ruler shared it and trembled for his crown before a possible usurper; accepting the vaticination of sages, it gives us a sense that Jesus was especially cared for by heaven; it gave Matthew the opportunity to apply prophecy to Jesus as he has such a passion for doing, although often as here without appositeness; it provides for Jesus a sojourn in Egypt, brief though it was, and thus brings his life into some analogy with the children of Israel who dwelt there from Jacob to Moses; it gave an added motive to the deep if repressed aversion of Jesus' circle and the Jews generally to the Romans who were the agents of Jesus' execution, although Pilate was more just than Herod. Dread of the latter's successor impelled Jesus' parents upon their return from Egypt to settle not in Judea but in Galilee, although by means of this fear Yahveh was at the same time accomplishing a prediction that Jesus was to be Nazarene and also "called out" of Egypt, for prophecy was inexorable like the Greek fates. To fulfill it is represented by the synoptics not as a conscious purpose of Jesus but as God's way of controlling the destiny of his son from first to last.

With this ends the meagre canonical record of the infancy which was to be so copiously amplified by tradition later. The latter made Jesus a wondrous infant, far more so than the holy bambino suggests. The light that streamed from his body and

the temple when he was twelve. When Buddha entered school he knew all the sixty-four Hindu writings, astonished and confused his teachers, fell into an ecstasy of pious meditation, and lingered a whole day until, at night, when his father discovered him, he first blamed his lack of spiritual insight, but returned home and dwelt with him, accommodating himself to the customs of the world, and busied with endeavors to become more pure and perfect.

the halo about his head express the natural charm that attaches to infancy raised to its highest potency, for he was not only a *Liebeskind* but a *Wunderkind*, and although far more is said about his being adored than about his being loved, in the history of child-study we have few times, places and people wherein childhood has been even more worshiped than loved. The newborn child comes in a sense direct from God or out of the heart and soul of nature and it is easy for parents to abandon themselves till they find a charm in every feature, contour, act, and enmesh the infant in superstitions and credulities some of which are cherished for each child only in the heart of its mother. In the case of Jesus the rudeness of the stable environment gives a good background for maternal tenderness, makes it more necessary and brings it out in bolder relief by way of contrast. Even if supernal beings and happenings are not an integral part of the psychic furniture of parents' minds, what mother has not at least flittingly thought of some kinship of her offspring with deity? It is, however, a strange note that this conviction despite all we are told did not take deep or permanent possession of Mary's mind as is apparent in the signs of her incredulity concerning her son's mission.

Jesus was a *first born child*. Modern science inclines us to think that the endowments of heredity for the eldest child are at least in some slight degree inversely as in most ages his superior rights of inheritance have been. The record distinctly eliminates (Mat. I, 25) the perfervor of the first stages of married life to which some assign the cause for the inferiority which is often considered a handicap on the future life of eldest children. The record more directly seeks to intimate that there were no accidents of *prima paru* which could cause any stigmata. Thus it seems as though here nature and instinct did their perfect work and that prenatal influences, which now in the ebb of the wave of Weismannism are being more and more credited, were, despite the journey and the untoward environment, on the whole ideally favorable to the best that nature could do, so that the child entered the world with the full and maximal momentum of a favorable heredity, the first fruit of parents whose average age might not have been very far from that which modern statistics of greatest viability in the offspring designate as the most favorable for parenthood. At

least there is no reason to doubt that both were at the zenith of their mental and physical development or near the apex of maturity which gives greatest completeness of all reproductive energies.

We can at least conjecture that Jesus was especially a *mother's child*. Fatherhood, whatever we make of the record, is more in the background. Tradition makes Mary fairest among women and her beauty may have been transmitted to her son, despite the ugliness of the earliest portraits of Jesus, whose form and figure do small credit to his mother's or father's good looks. The holy mother is most beloved and is represented as devoted to her son to the end of his life, long after the death of Joseph. There is much reason to believe that sons tend to produce the psychic superiorities of their mother and girls of their father, while boys inherit from the latter chiefly their physical traits. At any rate, there are principles of cross inheritance. The closest association between mother and son is involved in the entire development of Mariolatry and the trait of meekness and subjection to the divine will, a note first so strongly struck in Mary's attitude at the annunciation, is also cardinal in the teachings of Jesus, a point that Harnack has pointed out. Moreover the beautiful soul of Jesus was very rarely endowed with intuitive powers which also suggests maternal predominance or prepotency.

Fascinating, especially to celibacy, in all ages is the rare union in one person of the charms of virginity and maternity. Maidenhood has charms all its own, with its delicacy, unsullied purity, reserve, idealization, intuitive penetration, and these in many a chapter of history and literature have achieved great things for the individual and for the race. Motherhood beams with a very different light. The bud has blossomed and borne fruit, the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and also the tree of life have been tasted, the intuitions are larger, the quality of innocence loftier. These two sides of womanhood here blended have evoked love and adoration in the world second only to that which Jesus himself has called forth. Religious sentiment here idealizes woman as she is conceived to have come from the hand of God, and many a Protestant envies his Catholic friends their attitude toward the Blessed Virgin. No one has ever asked

whether she knew Egyptian, Chaldean, or even could read or write her own tongue. She cannot be conceived as bemoaning fancied limitations of her sex or wishing to make sex a sect, but she triumphs and glories in her womanhood and has been adored all these ages as its supreme type, more generic, nearer to the race, richer in love, unselfish devotion and intuition than man, so that the Madonna idea which teaches that it is more holy to be woman than to have achieved eminence in any kind of superiority, should teach our own sex a corresponding lesson. The worship of Mary has been of potent influence in safeguarding womanhood from the growing danger that it will decline from its orbit, lose just confidence and due pride in its sex as such, till in lapsing toward mannish ways its original divinity becomes clouded.

But even if this occurred, we have another oracle most closely associated with "*das ewige weibliche*" and to which we can always turn, viz., *das ewige kindliche*. The oracles of the latter will never fail. However distracted we are in the mazes of new knowledges, skills, ideals, conflicts between old and new, unable though we may be to thrid all the mazes of our manifold modern cultures, we do know that there is now one supreme source to which we can look for guidance and which alone can tell us what is really best worth knowing and doing, save us from misfits, perversions, the wastage of premature and belated knowledge, and that is the child in our midst that still leads us because it holds all the keys of the future, so that service to it is the best criterion of all values. It epitomizes the developmental stages of the race, human and prehuman, is the goal of all evolution, the highest object of that strange new love of the naïve, spontaneous and unsophisticated in human nature, so that we might freely paraphrase the old prayer of the most ardent of all the church fathers, Tertullian, "Stand forth, O heart and soul of childhood. Reveal thyself to us more fully. We want thee stark naked, unclothed of all disguises, false tastes, bad habits, partial theories, with the purity of that divinity in thee unshadowed just as thou camest forth into the world, fresh from the hand of the Heavenly Father. The norm of thy development is our only sure guide, our pillar of cloud by day and fire by night."

Thus in the combined mother-child worship we have a new orientation of the world toward the ingenuous, germinant, unconscious, instinctive elements of life.

Joseph was a dreamer. Four times his chief decisions were motivated by an angel in a dream, perhaps the same one that appeared in the collocation with Mary, each intervention being in the interest of the child as if Gabriel were perhaps its special guardian. Jesus does not seem to have inherited his oneiro-mantic tendency even if Joseph was his father, unless in the far more generalized and lofty propensity to commune with spiritual powers, although the Johanine is more suggestive of some such paternal propensity than the Petrine Jesus. Still, if, as tradition has it, Joseph was old and Mary young, and age in the parent tends to precocity, while the youth of Mary would tend to the conservation in the offspring of the best traits of childhood, we have in Jesus' premature wisdom, on the one hand, and his naïveté and spontaneity on the other, traits that well comport with this combination of adolescence and senescence in the parents.

Finally, it would be cowardly to refuse to face certain ancient traditions and various heretics, skeptics and schismatics since Cerinthus such as have appeared adown the Christian centuries, and a few contemporary writers who have intimated that Jesus was the natural child of both his parents, while some of them have gone so far as to insist that his conception was the result of love without wedlock. This view has never had any very able or scholarly presentation, and has always been extremely repugnant to the Christian consciousness. Many if not most Christologists now really hold with Keim that it was all a sublime afterthought, that the idea of divine parentage owed its origin to motives that arose later, and that Jesus and his parents lived and died with no suspicion on the part of their neighbors and friends of anything exceptional in his birth, and that there was no taint of calumny in this respect from his enemies. Every candid mind will admit that from the biological standpoint alone considered it would be hard to demonstrate any necessary disadvantage in legal or technical illegitimacy *per se*. Not only have there been great and good bastards in history, but many authorities conclude that foundlings, who are usually illegitimate, are not inferior in health, strength, beauty or in-

telligence, while some have even thought them superior to the average child, or at least to what the latter would be if reared under similar and usually disadvantageous circumstances. They certainly excel in viability orphans, one or both of whose parents are usually less vital than the average. To assume that affection strong enough to defy social restraints is associated with an unusual degree of fecund energy, or that in the classes where such restraints are really felt, as they were intensely among the Jews, there is more probability of real affinity according to the complemental theories of Schopenhauer or Weininger or any other, would indeed in the present state of our knowledge upon these themes be probably unwarranted. There may be, however, some degree of comfort in reflecting that in case the higher or lower criticism should ever compel us to fall back to this position, all would not be lost and that we might even find some unexplored sources of consolation, perhaps in the ancient and long drawn out Stoic distinction between nature and convention, or between life on the one hand and the man-made law and institutions on the other, which would suggest where the line of the new apologetics as to this point could best be reformed. If there be in the record or in contemporary tradition any suggestion of a cruder moral or social state where paternity is more uncertain than maternity, there is no less evidently a somewhat compensating intimation of the stage of the pristine power of the mother to tame and domesticate the father, while even if complete capitulation were ever made to these fears, we may hope it will not be until the world is sufficiently enlightened and democratized to deeply feel, as we do in modern instances of those who come into the world handicapped by such a stigma, that a man is really what he is for all that. The most superficial periscope will show that granting even the literary truth of the record, there would have been contemporary gossips who doubted as Joseph himself did when "minded to put her away." She was passing fair but beauty sometimes provokes envy and stirs malicious tongues, and the record does not intimate that these were silenced by any vision such as that which quieted the mind of Joseph. Everything we know of these days indicates that irregularity in this respect, even in the humblest classes, would not escape censure, such was the rigor of the Hebrew conscience upon this point. Some

have urged that even if there was danger of a social taint or the suspicion of a lapsus this would not ill comport with the prenatal trip to Bethlehem which might have had another cause than the desire to be honestly taxed or with the nest-hiding intimation of birth in the stable or even the foreign trip to Egypt just afterward. If this was in the slightest degree the case, detractors were met by the boldest of all possible poetic conceptions which must have been at the very least no less effective than they are in the church now. Many women since, too, some mothers of historic significance as well as others of enfeebled minds, have yielded to a superstitious interpretation of the natural exaltation that comes to all normal and right womanhood in whom the consciousness of prospective maternity is implanted, for many of them have yielded to the fond illusion of impregnation from supernal personages. Some superstitious mind-and-faith-curists of our own day are sincere in the conviction that if faith is strong enough this can occur without male agency, as if by recrudescence of the long-lost power of parthenogenesis. We must admit that the narrative as it stands, although a masterpiece of what might be called the higher psychopedagogical engineering or politics, and although as we have tried to show, it is a key to perhaps the greatest culture question of early Christianity, will continue in the future, as it has been in the past, to be a stumbling-block to morosophs and skeptics of the coarser type.

Save only the resurrection, nothing in the New Testament puts such a strain on faith as does the demand to accept the conception of Mary by the Holy Ghost literally as a biological fact. It is especially hard on educated young people, who have been brought up within the pale of the church, while the reticence that veils such subjects makes the problem which we now approach all the harder. Hence *its pedagogy* presents one of the most difficult problems in the whole field of religious education. To merely protest that it is a physiological impossibility is both banal and tends to obliviousness to its higher symbolic meanings, which are of greatest culture value, because such a course tends to obscure still more our sense of what the mythopeic folk-soul is and does and is thus not only anti-aesthetic but anti-religious. To discuss frankly in detail, as we have tried to do, the psychic core behind belief in it as a fact and

its implications, is, we freely admit, not without danger to the average lay believer (whom we are not addressing here) of encountering the resistance by which the normal instinctive shame and modesty tend to veil sex, but also of arousing the old *odium theologicum* to the highest pitch now permitted to it. Analysis of this belief is the last thing the church wants or that the clergy will permit or even undertake in their own souls. It is a holy mystery from which they as rigidly exclude reason and science as the church of the past did where it felt its own precious values jeopardized. For this attitude the modern geneticist has no longer censure but seeks only to offer both appreciation and explanation. The middle way between both these extremes first recommended concerning this (and two or three other cardinal articles of ancient faith), is to ignore and allow it to lapse quietly to innocuous desuetude from the Christian consciousness, which has now other and more pressing themes. Its ritual iteration has been called now a mere form, a vague invention, an *auto de fe*, a protestation of loyalty not so much to the particular fact as to what the founders used so vitally to believe, or an expression of tenderness to the obsolete convictions of our forbears, a modern instance expressive of the old instinct that made Confucian ancestor worship, etc. Another form of this tendency now appears in the call to all who are both cultured and Christian to strive to realize to the saturation point all the higher spiritual meanings of this dogma, till the inner conflict concerning its literary verisimilitude is forgotten, somewhat as we have tried to do above. Intense and many as are the storms of controversy that have raged throughout every Christian century about this point, it is happily no longer a storm center, save only at a certain stage of development during the storm and stress period of youth. Here it is perhaps experienced academic teachers of religious thinking who best of all realize how often ephebic doubt, which may in the end sweep away all ecclesiastical influences, begins with this to it veritable *caput mortuum*.

Now the psychological fact is that each of the above trends exists in every one intelligently interested in Christianity. Those at the extreme of assent and dissent and all those between differ only in the degree of prepotency of the one or the other of these dispositions and in the rigor with which they seek to repress the

non-preferred and submerged inclinations in their own souls of the deeper unconscious tendencies of which even the expert psychologist still knows so little. It is only a commonplace to note that many of the most vociferous denunciations of heresy in others are really often only attempts to exorcise the spectre of doubt in the minds of champions of the faith. What was it that inspired Omar, the friend and successor of Mohamet, having just seen his master breathe his last, to go out of the tent and affirm with the most solemn oath that the founder of the Moslem faith still literally lived and vow to decapitate anyone who doubted or denied it? Why, when it was proven by every method of critical evidence, that William Tell was a solar hero and never really existed, did Swiss scholars who knew better deny it and excuse themselves for so doing because of the fear of its effects upon Swiss patriotism as well as upon the local prestige of Uri, which abounded with historical monuments commemorative of incidents in Tell's career? It is easy to say that in all such cases, in the phrases of Kant, the founder of the pragmatism that James, Schiller, Dewey and especially Vaihinger have elaborated, that the postulates of the practical may suspend the pure reason and assert their native predominance over the understanding or that the will or wish to believe becomes supreme or that feeling, particularly the sentiment of conviction, transcends the intellect. This fertile trend of thought helps us very much and is in the right direction, but farther explanation is necessary and is now to some extent possible here.

Deep down in every individual slumbers a racial soul which acts autistically and comes into the consciousness of the individual only in the most imperfect and fragmentary way as the writhings of the giant Enceladus were fabled to cause the occasional eruptions of Etna. To grasp another halting metaphor (for truth here has as yet no language save symbols, and these are but faintly suggestive), all strata of man's soul abound in fossils representing many long past stages of culture history, only they are not dead fossils but forces still very active below the threshold of consciousness. The fundamental mechanism here involved first crassifies into material form truths too volatile to be otherwise held. Such varieties are materialized and cached in myths and rites. A strong propensity to inertia in-

clines us to escape from the attempts to realize them in the here and now, but nevertheless to sacredly conserve them for the future benefit of the self or the race soul. They are mummies, penates, idols of an unknown but not unknowable divinity, which transcends them. In this form they are above fact and are a part of the larger history of the race which has not yet been written because it has not yet occurred. The affirmation of credence in this dogma, for such it is, in the face of modern science, suggests an iceberg broken from some ancient glacier and full of frozen or fossil remains of life, long since extinct, moving sometimes with crushing momentum, directly against a strong wind, a phenomenon which would seem paradoxical to one who did not know that it was impelled by a deeper, stronger, denser undercurrent. The wind which carries all surface flotsam in its own direction can only reduce the momentum of the iceberg since it is nine-tenths under water, showing but one-tenth of its bulk to the less dense element above. To those who do not know psychic undertows, there seems thus now a new miracle, viz., the fact that intelligent people protest belief in such a surd. Credence of Luke's story of the inception of Jesus' life itself is now a marvel and indeed it would be so had it actually occurred as recorded. We make it true because we want it to be so, and we wish it true because the feelings, which is a collective name for the blurred vestiges of ancestral experience in us, betone and animate it with their own creative vitality.

Thus at bottom man feels his own nature to be divine. He dimly senses, though he knows it not, that all deities are ejects, projects, ectypes of his own being, objectified in the interests of his own better self-knowledge, self-reverence, and self-control. He does not venture to affirm all this of his own individuality for he is too conscious of personal limitations and defects. He feels dimly vast and transcending possibilities in himself as if the entire genus homo were trying to come to the birth in him. He responds and even aspires to all that is best and greatest in life, history, art, religion, and tends more or less faintly to realize all his wildest ideals and ambitions, for the good, beautiful and true, but on the other hand he feels his own "excelsior" impulsions thwarted, repressed, checked, gradually finds that he must renounce the fulfillment of most of his wishes and youthful day-dreams. Hence he comes to have a sense of

inferiority, incompleteness, sin, ignorance, weakness, if not insignificance. His fond longings do not materialize but on the contrary they fade so that there is always progressive disappointment, disillusion, a sense of shortage and unworthiness, which may culminate in despair. This experience is inevitable and universal, varying only in degree as we pass from the earlier and more generic on toward the later and more specific stages of life.

When to man, torn with these antagonistic experiences comes the suggestion that there is or was a member of his own species, in all points like him, who actualized all his fond might-have-beens (even though he had to give them another and better interpretation), an exemplar embodying the higher man idea which was in danger of being lost, who not only lived and died but was even conceived without taint of man's gravest sin, who lived himself out fully and with abandon, with no repression, and nevertheless was faultless, who was a complete man and also at the same time all that there was of essential divinity:—this suggestion men seized upon with an avidity unprecedented. It was the gladdest possible gospel, evangel, good tidings. It appealed to the oldest, deepest things in the soul, which had been long overlaid. It brought salvage by reversion to the oldest, deepest, soundest elemental forces in human nature, before it was fabled to have fallen to a stage of less vitality, a pristine experience which old oracles typified as eviction from paradise. Man found consolation for a sense of his own defects by falling in love with the highest redaction of his old ideals of humanity that he could make. If the individual was frail and sinful, the type man that slumbered deep within him incarnated all the best things, that man in all his history had ever imagined. There will thus forever be a sense in which the full deification of Jesus means the potential deification of man. Thus in the story of Jesus' conception the folk-soul completed the apotheosis of man. Jesus coming down to earth is only the ambivalent form of saying that man was exalted to divine sonship. Each is the necessary truth and complement of the other. Our belief in it is a revived wish of the infancy of our race and helps it on toward re-realization.

All religions, particularly the Hebrew Christian, bottom in a sense of loss and restitution or departure from a norm and

return to it. Something archetypal was lost and is found. The psychogenetic problem is what is typified by the reminiscence of paradise to which we hark back. To this problem I find an answer new and true in the cycle of thought represented by Durkheim and his school, which so far as it applies here may be succinctly stated as follows. There was once a stage, through which all races passed, which was marked by tribal solidarity of a kind and degree we have so far lost that it is hard for us to even conceive it. The supreme, all-absorbing unity was the social group, clan or tribe, in which the individual lived, moved and had his being, or was as a cell in a larger organism. All he was and did was in its service. Sometimes, as in corroborees, or in time of great public excitement or danger, all not only came together but acted, felt, thought as one, and personal ends were completely merged in those of the social group. Of this stage we have a survival although a very aberrant one in the psychology of the mob. Each felt strong, was angry, fearful, good or bad, with the strength, etc., of the whole, and so each was exalted, ecstatic, enlarged, potentialized as the spirit of the community entered, expanded, and swept through his soul, and all his always very strong gregarious instincts reached their acme upon such occasions. These experiences constituted inspiration, regeneration, for the incipient fragmentary isolated egos that combined in them. Real life was experienced on these communal, festal occasions when each person's individuality was merged in the soul of his folk—at the same time swallowed up and vastated and reinforced. Perhaps, too, as this group of investigators opine, in this state the individual transcended even the species to which he belonged and had an experience of unique unity and fusion between himself and the universe, becoming sympathetically one not only with his clan but with nature itself.

However that be, our point is that religious experiences to-day are reminiscent of this largely lost state of solidarity, and that our devotion to the type-man, Jesus, is reinforced by this atavistic element that had its source as indicated above. The "saved" soul's attitude toward Jesus has thus as one of its survival components what our ancient tribesmen forbears felt in their joint celebrations toward the sippe, stirp or social whole of which each was a member. The devotion and loyalty and

even their direction, when we analyze from patent to latent, is the same in both, although its object is given a more definite, personal, artistic and morally more perfect as well as a more portative embodiment, for Jesus typifies the human race and not merely one aggregation of its units. The conception myth means not that one individual of it but the genus man was God-made, however we interpret God, even indeed if we identify him with nature.

When man slowly achieved the conquest of the great mammals between whom and himself the struggle for existence was so long and hard, glowed with the first flush of lordship over the brute creation, and realized that there was nothing higher in the world than he, and when capping all this he developed a few strong human groups, perhaps themselves isolated when the globe was sparsely populated, but often meeting and subduing other weaker groups and amalgamating them into an ever larger aggregate (meanwhile anthropomorphizing nature in all its aspects), it is no wonder that he felt his type or *eidōs* to be the consummate thing in all the cosmos, at the same time its crown and its key, and so often came to project images of his collective folk-self as gods, always made, if always unconsciously, in his own image. His deities of old tell us what man really thought of himself and his species. His pride often made him excite even the envy of the gods he had made, and he was always bending them to his will, while their very nature and doings were simply the objectivization of his own inmost collective soul. They were made of his own traits and ideals and their degree of objective reality was exactly inversely as man's lack of knowledge of his larger, social self and its theo-thetic activities. To bring them back, to re-subjectify them, is the perennial endeavor of religion. To ascribe to them the power to generate men, however, always marks an important step in their subordination and rehumanization. Having begotten, gods re-enter the domain of man and take the first step toward their own dedivinization. After Christ became God we hear no more of the sublime Jehovah of the prophets inhabiting eternity, filling space, etc., for his absoluteness was gone and his twilight had begun. Whatever theory of kenosis or the degree in which God went over to his human son in the incarnation we proffer, the conception of the latter was the knell of the old prophetic magnification of

his infinite attributes. He is no longer transcendental, independent, apart or above, but is smalled down to the compass and dimensions of man from whom he sprang, on whom all ideas of the gods are first patterned. With Jesus' origin some virtue went out of Yahveh and certain of his more absolute traits were sloughed off, so that he and his kingdom could be reidentified with man and his kingdom. We can thus already see that here as everywhere orthodoxy is only an effort to conserve the right intellectual conception of man's orthogenesis and is always both truer and wiser than it knows.

Primitive Christianity thus meant race solipsism so far as pertained to religion, all of which was resolved back into man, as Berkeley and idealism by his slogan, *Esse est percipi*, reduced all the world back into the individual, and the idealism of Fichte resolved it back into an absolute will, as Hegel did into reason. These three thinkers were only doing over again, although far more consciously and methodically for nature, what Jesus, John, Paul and the early Christians, had done more instinctively and unconsciously for God and all his entourage. In the first centuries of our era, in other words, theology began to be slowly resolved back to anthropology, as later epistemological idealism had anthropomorphized nature in its way. Patristic literature was constantly applying the predicates of God not so much to man in general as to *redeemed* man, as mystics have always been fond of doing. Much that Feuerbach says along this line would have been truer had he not made the fatal mistake of relatively ignoring the difference between the redeemed and the wicked because God and man become identical chiefly only in the soul of saints and the elect. In them prayer is a dialogue between the individual and the racial or unconscious self within, misconceived as without, himself. Thus there is a sense in which man's knowledge of God is progressive self-knowledge. Especially in becoming good man becomes God, participating more or less in his ipsissimal nature. This saving sense of kind was not absent from the souls of the wicked and vestiges of it were even in devils. It is thus man's better generic self outwardly projected that man has always and everywhere worshipped. Religion apotheosized man, purging away all individual sin and error and than himself thus spiritualized there is no other God. Thus only a son of man can become son of God. First man

strove so long and hard to exalt himself to deity that he overdid it and so later had to struggle long and hard again to reduce Godhood back to humanity. Now universal man (as once it was only totemic, racial man) is the only criterion of truth as well as of all moral and other values. God is the soundest core and essence, the truest instinct of man. As known he is our own deepest self-knowledge and as unknown he is man's sub- or unconscious nature, and hence his objectivity is always secondary and never primary. The antithesis between God and man is then really that between the individual and the genus homo, Comte's "*Le grande être*," Hobbe's "*Leviathan*" at its best, purified, sublimated, made free and invested with all the worthy attributes of the race. His goodness, justice, love, etc., are really man's and valid only to and in man. He is the truth, virtue, beauty of man. The real atheist is thus only he who denies these attributes to man. To think meanly of one is to do so of the other. Thus man is not merely the measure of the religious world but the *fons et origo* of it all. In the stage of heterization, or the diastole of the folk-soul, it ascribes to God all that it wishes but has had to renounce for itself, so that, as objective, he is our relinquished self or its complement. The Pelagians said man, the Augustinians said God, is good, wise, great etc. Both are true and the truth of each lies in the reciprocal ambivalent truth of the other. This is the only sense in which God is the creation of man. Having been thus evolved in the slow saecular process of psychogenesis, he became himself invested with personality, turns back, makes man his object and is said to reveal to man again the stored-up wisdom, goodness, etc., with which humanity had gradually endowed him. Thus man became the object of the subject he had made and to whom he had given power over him. Then comes a third and final stage in which man himself, having been the victim of the creation of his own soul, to which he had long subjected and even humiliated himself, began to realize that his gods and religion are really made by his own deeper and always creative soul. As this process of realization advances, man feels himself immeasurably exalted and even rejuvenated, and this process and result is the essence of Christianity. Thus we have a reciprocity; now objectivity is very real and crass, and then subjectivity in its turn may go too far.

We might thus add to the motto *vox populi, vox dei*, and say the soul of the people is the very soul of God. This republics and democracies should feel even more than monarchies which are in fact always less theocratic.

Now nothing in the culture history of the past has been so fecundating as these processes, especially when the analytic stage is passing into the synthetic, deities are slowly reducing themselves to human form and the bifurcation of *Diesseits* and *Jenseits* is being overcome. Thus some of the *obiter dicta* of Feuerbach may still be of service in bringing into clearer light a new philosophical appreciation of the birth story of Jesus. It might be called the return of the not so much prodigal as ostracized God to his father, man. He had wandered into a far country and lived there long in splendor, but the lure of the fairest of earth's daughters only typifies his home-sickness for his fatherland, Mansoul. So there is a sense in which generic man or humanity is truly God's father and is recognized as such by the title son of God, which Jesus gave to himself. Thus God's homecoming commemorates man's coming to the glory and strength of his maturity, and Christianity is thus documented as the best and last of all religions, for it is all *ad maiorem gloriam hominis*. Of this new debut of God or of God's return into human life and of the prodigious advance which its ever deepening widening processional down the Christian centuries caused, Luke's preluding galaxy of introductory incidents to this supreme human drama, is a fit and noble proem.

THE ATTITUDE TOWARD DEATH AND THE TYPES OF BELIEF IN IMMORTALITY; A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

BY R. S. ELLIS.

INTRODUCTION.

Death has had a profound influence on the human mind. Much of the progress of science has been due to the hope of finding an elixir of life that would avert or at least postpone the fatal shears. "Death," says Schopenhauer, "is the inspiring genius or Apollo of philosophy. . . . Without death there would hardly be philosophizing." (Werke, hrsg. von Deussen, München, 1911, II., 527.) But if science and philosophy owe much to death, religion owes even more. It is primarily the fact of death that has made man feel the helplessness, the dependence, which Schleiermacher calls the essence of religion. It is death that has caused man to ask what is the value of life, and it is death that has forced upon him the imperative question, "What follows?" To this question mankind has almost universally replied with a belief in the preservation in some way of the individual's life. The problem of death is thus inseparable from that of the belief in a future life, and it is with it as such that we shall be primarily concerned in this paper.

Upon the hopes and fears connected with death and the future life religion has long placed great reliance in attempting to control man's moral conduct. It will hardly be denied that the consciousness of the necessity of death and the belief in a future life where virtue will be rewarded and vice punished has often been productive of great good, neither can it well be denied that it has often been productive of evil, and this evil has not been limited to the vicious practices of savages,—it is also found in our midst. Dr. Hall in discussing the fear of death writes: "The development of the doctrine of immortality, and its utilization as a moral motive, vast and preponderating as is the service it has rendered, has also brought a body of terrors, which work havoc with many nervous systems, not tonic

enough to react properly to them. How rightly to administer this fear, which has always been one of the chief problems of religion, seems to be looming up again to pedagogy. For practical as well as scientific reasons, further studies are urgently needed here to give eschatological problems a firmer and more natural foundation." (25:224.)

Unquestionably the belief in a future life needs to be submitted to a psychological analysis in order that its motive force may be more intelligently and effectively utilized. Psychology cannot, it is true, determine the ontological validity of the belief in immortality and in this paper we shall not attempt to discuss that phase of the problem. We shall not raise the question as to whether man is or is not immortal,—that may well be left for the philosophers and theologians. Our problem is to determine the sources of the belief in immortality, to find the value of these as controls of conduct, and finally to indicate the pragmatic or pedagogical application of the results to moral and religious education.

Nearly all men have believed in and desired some form of immortality but the desire has been by no means limited to personal immortality. The Buddhist does not believe in, nor does he desire, personal survival,—his ideal is rather through devotion to the welfare of his fellow men to rid himself of the traits that make him an individual and finally to merge again with the spirit of the cosmos. In so doing he believes that through his good works he secures for himself an immortality of influence. This desire for influential immortality is world-wide though most consciously expressed by peoples of the highest civilization. The third form of the desire for immortality is, in terminology at least, the outgrowth of Weissman's theory of the immortality of the germ plasm and has received the name 'plasmic immortality.' This is, as its name indicates, the immortality that one has in his descendants. Francis Galton has probably done most to show the true significance of this kind of immortality and it has received its most conscious expression in the eugenics movement of the present. It is not, however, essentially a doctrine of modern times,—the idea and the desire are common among primitive men.

We have differentiated the immortality belief into three types: personal, influential, and plasmic. All of these are to

some extent egoistic but in influential and plasmic immortality there is much more of altruism than of egoism,—they tend to place the emphasis on the immortality of the race rather than on that of the individual. Spidle objects that the latter two of these conceptions are not to be classed as beliefs at all because they are in a way certainties (41:12); but theoretically as well as practically it is desirable that we know which of these forms of the desire is truest to human nature and thus offers the greatest possibilities for the control of conduct. In order to understand better the true significance of the different beliefs we shall trace their development both phylogenetically and ontogenetically and attempt to estimate more accurately the forces to which each owes its being.

THE PHYLOGENETIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATTITUDE TOWARD DEATH AND THE BELIEF IN IMMORTALITY.

It was only with the dawn of human intelligence that the problem of death really arose. On the intellectual side this was due largely to the development of articulate speech, for along with this has developed the ability to reason abstractly and thus to grapple with problems that otherwise would not have aroused interest to a very great extent. Speech further made possible the transmission of thought from individual to individual and so created a tremendously broader mental world. Imagination was intensified and intellectual curiosity increased. The basis was thus found for a gradually increasing social heredity, and as the mental life of the individual was no longer limited by the limits of his own sensory experience the possibility of the rise and spread of any belief was greatly increased. Moreover, the increase in intellectual curiosity and ability naturally led man to a realization of what no animal seems to know, namely, that he must die.

In addition to his superiority of intellect man also has more highly developed emotions which cause him to feel more keenly certain aspects of his experience. He is more essentially a social being,—is more dependent on the co-operation of his fellows than is any other animal. But his greatest superiority over the lower animals lies in his moral development which causes him to demand that the world be governed by the law of justice.

The imperative prerequisite to this higher development was a longer period of immaturity as has been shown by Fiske. But along with this there has necessarily come an increase in parental care and affection. Man, far more than any of the lower animals, loves and cares for his offspring. The recognition of this fact is so important in considering the rival claims of personal and racial immortality that it seems well to consider the statements of several authorities on the subject. Sutherland says: ". . . in the struggle for existence an immense premium is placed on parental care, and . . . not until this has been developed can the higher nervous types become possible." (45:I. 40.) Ratzel writes of primitive man: "Motherly love is so natural a sentiment that the modes of expressing it need no authentication; but we often come across instances of tenderness on the father's part toward his offspring. No doubt there are cases of cruelty, but these are exceptions. All who have gone deeply into the question agree in praising the peaceful and kindly way in which those of one household live together among uncorrupted natural races" (33:I. 122.) Westermarck likewise says: "That the maternal sentiment is universal in mankind is a fact too generally admitted to need demonstration; not so the father's love of his children. Savage men are commonly supposed to be very indifferent towards their offspring; but a detailed study of the facts leads us to a different conclusion. It appears that, among the lower races, the paternal sentiment is hardly less universal than the maternal" (48:529.) Westermarck continues by citing numerous authorities showing that most savage tribes show strong parental affection. We cannot, I think, safely question his conclusion. The very existence of any tribe is sufficient proof of the parental affection of its members. How vitally important this fact is will appear as we continue our study.

Before taking up the primitive conception of death and the future life one further problem, the primitive conception of the soul, remains to be considered. To understand what is primitive man's idea of the soul is, as Durkheim says, no easy matter; for the ideas of civilized men who believe most firmly in its existence are likely to be varied, fluctuating and obscure, and we should not expect primitive man to have even so clear

ideas as his more enlightened brothers. A review of primitive beliefs on the subject will, however, bring out several important points.

The objects to which souls are attributed by different tribes vary from tribe to tribe. In Australian tribes, for example, men are always supposed to have a soul while in some cases women and children do not. (13:344.) Other tribes credit almost everything with a soul; the Fijians, for example, "attributed souls to animals, vegetables, stones, . . . and many other things" (21:410), but all of the things credited with a soul were generally thought of as being animate. In fact, Arnett concludes that "By soul the savage probably means life" (3:153). This view is supported by several facts: the soul grows and decays with the body (13:347); it is considered to be the blood or breath, or to be located in some vital part of the body as the heart or the head (13:348). Often the shadow or the reflection in water were supposed to be souls. (23:77-100.) In fact a man might have several souls, the Bataks had seven. (11:112.) These could and quite often did exist apart from the body. It left the body during sleep, or if the savage were going into battle he could leave his soul in a safe place so that he could not be injured. (22:II. 95sq.) Very often the individual had a race soul and an individual soul and the former of these remained with the totem plant or animal. But whatever else the soul was, it was always life and power.

As we have stated, primitive man did not limit life to things really alive, but neither did he regard all things as animate. If he did so he made great allowances for variations in the degree of animation of different objects. To a certain extent then at least certain objects were the antithesis of soul. His world was dualistic, though not absolutely so. He comes to differentiate body and soul and to consider the latter as the essential principle of life.

The causes of this separation of body and soul are probably many but one of the strongest must have been the dream. As Ferenczi has shown, primitive man's beliefs are largely governed by *die Allmacht der Gedanken*. He places greater value upon his psychic experiences than does his more realistic civilized brother. Like the child he does not always separate the real and the ideal. And so when he wanders in a dream from

the place where he fell asleep and finally awakes to be told by his fellows that his body has not moved, he very naturally reaches the conclusion that it was his soul that was wandering apart from his body. Or again when in a dream he sees a dead friend whose body he has seen decay he is likely to conclude on awakening that he has seen a real soul or ghost and hence that his friend's soul or ghost exists apart from his body. As a matter of fact savages believe that sleep as well as death is caused by the soul being away from the body. (21:291, 395.) It is probable that the dream is largely responsible for the belief. This argument is, as is well known, an old one in anthropology.

To the influence of this should be added that of seeing ghosts at night while awake; for, as Crawley has shown, the soul is largely a product of night. (11:208.) Such illusions have probably done much to develop the belief in the soul and its survival of bodily death.

A view as to the origin of the idea of the soul that is well worthy of consideration is presented by Crawley, who says: "When primitive man first saw an object in memory, he saw the soul for the first time; he was then conscious of something besides the thing,—the mental replica, the thought of the thing." (11:76.) "The idea of the soul is thus the automatic result of the reaction to perception; it is a mental repetition of sensation." (11:75.) And from this it follows that "The soul is, by the very fact of its origin, separable from the personality." (11:212.) There is probably much truth in this view.

If we regard the soul as representing the life and power of any object then its origin would be only a matter of forming an idea of and giving a name to life as the savage saw it. Their beliefs support this view abundantly: to steal a man's soul is to kill him, the lightning kills the soul of a tree when it strikes it, etc. Thus considered there is no mystery attached to the origin of the belief though much has been attached to it in its development.

Let us now consider the primitive conception of death. On the lowest scale of intelligence death is regarded as an unnatural occurrence, as something that cannot result from natural causes. It is believed that human life would continue forever on this planet if some supernatural agency did not

intervene. Thus Durkheim, who has made a careful study of the beliefs of primitive men, says: "in the lower societies death is never considered as a natural event due to the action of purely physical causes; it is generally attributed to the evil offices of some sorcerer." (13:373.) Quotations from numerous other authorities could be given to show the correctness of the above but they are unnecessary.

It does not seem difficult to account for this belief. To the savage, life seems to be the natural thing because he knows only life through experience. He knows exceedingly little of natural laws and in proportion as he is ignorant of the regularity of such apparently irregular phenomena as death he very naturally supposes the existence of some unknown force to bring them about. This belief in the natural immortality of man on earth does not then reveal any particular desire for immortality,—it betrays rather the inability of the intellect to cope with the riddle of death.

Rivers gives a somewhat different account of the primitive idea of death especially among the Melanesians. He says, "death in primitive thought is not an event, but a durable state or condition." (34:405.) The name for this state is *mate* and the very old and those for some time dead are alike said to be *mate*. There is no sharp point of transition from life to death, instead there is a gradual death beginning with the onset of senescence and continuing until the individual is forgotten. This shows how real the after life is to the savage.

Let us now see what primitive mourning and burial customs indicate as to primitive man's attitude toward death and his belief in immortality.

When death occurs in a tribe there is great lamentation and wailing. The relatives often cut off their hair, besmear themselves with dirt or other mixture, mutilate themselves with knives to an extreme extent, and at times they hire professional mourners to show their sorrow at the departure of the deceased. But it has been often noted that there is apparently as much if not more fear than sorrow evident in these demonstrations. The reason for this according to Frazer is two-fold: on the one hand the relatives fear that the ghost will be offended if he is not properly mourned for, and on the other hand they fear that they will be suspected of having plotted his death if they

do not show great sorrow at his death. (21:135sq.) This certainly brings out clearly primitive man's dislike and fear of death and the dead. His attitude will appear more clearly from certain burial customs.

The nature of the burial ceremony among primitive tribes as well as the attitude toward the dead is well shown by the following quotation from Howitt describing the ceremony among the Herbert River tribes of South-East Australia. He writes: "A shallow grave is dug with pointed sticks close to the water, and the father or brother of the deceased, if a man, or the husband if a woman, beat the body with a *Mera* or club, often so violently as to break the bones. Incisions are generally made in the stomach, on the shoulders, and in the lungs, and are filled with stones. After this the body is placed in the grave, the knees drawn up to the chin, and laid on its side, or seated head erect. Weapons, ornaments, in fact everything which the deceased had used in life, are put with the body, and the whole is covered up, and a hut is built on the top of the grave. A drinking vessel is put inside the hut, and a path is made to the water for the spirit to use. The legs are generally broken to prevent the spirit from wandering at night. The beating is given in order to so frighten the spirit that it would be unlikely to haunt the camp, and the stones are put in the body to prevent it from going too far afield. Food and water are often put on the grave. After the burial the camp is often shifted to a distance. The grave is visited and kept clean, often for years after. The spirits of the dead roam up and down for a time in the places they had frequented during life, but finally go to the Milky Way." (27:474.)

The foregoing description serves to bring out very clearly certain beliefs about the dead. The reader must be immediately impressed that to the primitive mind even a near relative may be a dangerous enemy when dead and so must be kept away from the living. The theory of Robinsohn that burial originated in the desire to render the dead harmless seems then to be highly probable. (36:126.) It further suggests that the tomb stone may have been originally intended to keep the dead man in his grave quite as much as to do him honor. (36:97sq.)

In addition to the above theory Scott suggests that the funeral ceremony is for the purpose of securing an irradiation of

grief by securing its free expression and at the same time removing further cause for grief by getting the corpse away.

Some explanation is needed to account for the tendency to make the grave as beautiful as possible. This appears in very low tribes and is partly to be accounted for by the desire to please the ghost and give it a pleasant place to dwell in. In case of civilized peoples, however, such an interpretation would obviously be untenable. A further reason must be found and it is present, I think, in the Freudian theory that burial is an unconscious *Deckphenomenon*, i. e., that it is for the purpose of covering up the memory of our sorrow and diverting our attention. By making the grave as beautiful as possible we lessen greatly our horror of the dead. The diversion is thus twofold: on the one hand the corpse is removed from sight so that we more easily forget its existence; on the other hand by making the burial place as beautiful as possible we tend to think more of the beauty of the visible monument than of the ghastliness of the invisible corpse. There is much in favor of this theory: without it, in fact, it does not seem at all easy to account for certain aspects of burial customs. In case of primitive men, however, it seems probable that a different principle is operating.

Here we may suppose with Freud that the feelings go in pairs of opposites and that even in those cases where a feeling is strongly expressed there is present at the same time, though unconsciously perhaps, its opposite. If we so regard the expressions of hatred and affection which primitive man has for his deceased relatives, the different ways of treating the dead though apparently in no way connected, will appear to be very closely related. Any apparently great affection may only be the conscious reaction to the unconscious fear and its attendant hatred which we have already seen so much evidence of. A feeling of guilt might in a similar way produce this extreme manifestation especially when the soul of the dead is supposed to be still in or near the body. There would be a strong impulse to show an unusual degree of affection toward a spirit that would be hurt or angry if neglected. This motive probably has much to do with the beautification of the grave, though we must admit that primitive man may at times be governed by other motives.

There are many other interesting details about the burial

customs of primitive men; there are many ways of disposing of the dead other than by inhumation but for our purposes they reveal nothing of great importance: all burial customs tend to show certain fundamental attitudes and beliefs and the case given brings these out sufficiently.

Even a hasty survey of primitive burial customs leaves no doubt that to primitive man death is not the end of life. He believes that after death the individual still lives, though the ideas as to the nature of this future life may vary from tribe to tribe. Let us now attempt to see to what this belief in continued existence is due.

Crawley, starting from his theory that the soul is a mental image, finds a ready solution for the problem. He says, "The germ of its immortality is in the fact that it exists in the brains of others. A man dies but his image remains. The fact of death does not necessarily alter the character of the mental image, though such alteration is found; the permanence of the soul depends on the length of the memory of the survivors, on the affection the dead man inspired, or the strength of his personality. Remarkable characters develop into 'ancestors' and 'heroes' . . . The savage has no idea of absolute immortality. The soul itself dies; its existence, that is, depends on the memory of others." (11:212.) Feuerbach expresses a similar view as to the origin of the belief in life after death. (17:103.) There is at least much truth in this theory.

The most fundamental, however, of the theories advanced to account for the belief in immortality is based on the familiar maxim, *Quod volumus, credimus*. Man believes in immortality because he does not wish to die; the will to live is so strong that it refuses to permit such an entire negation of life as is death to be recognized as true. This theory has been held since the time of Epicurus but has received additional support through the studies of myths made by such contemporary writers as Rank, Riklin and Abraham. They have shown that the great ethnic traditions and myths are the expression of wishes that are rooted in the innermost depths of the folk soul. The way in which this has worked in religious beliefs is particularly evident from the various conceptions of heaven: the Indian believes in a Happy Hunting Grounds; the Scandinavian warrior believes in Valhalla where the brave would join in feasts and

boast of their exploits, and the early Christians—under strong Hebrew influence—believed in a heaven of gold, silver and precious stones. In each case heaven has been fitted up to satisfy a characteristic national or racial desire.

The wish has its fulfillment through the imagination which tends to create worlds in accordance with desire. This is seen in the dream life. As we have already noted, the savage who sees his dead friends again in a dream very naturally supposes that they are still alive. His own soul wanders during his dreams and so why not after death? Dreams have played an important rôle in the lives of all peoples and it seems certain that they have been one of the factors in producing the belief in immortality, but it is the wish back of the dream that is fundamental. We shall observe the working of this tendency of the mind to believe what it wishes to believe as we review the belief in immortality as it has appeared among different tribes and in the great religions of the world.

To the reasons for the belief in immortality given above should be added one suggested by Runze who points out that the belief in continued existence is largely due to the inability of the understanding to grasp the fact of death. (37:96.) In this respect the behavior of man is often very similar to that of the lower animals.

Let us next turn our attention to the fear that the living have for the dead. This is well nigh universal,—in fact, few of our contemporaries who believe in ghosts—as not a few of them do—would care to spend a night alone in a house which they believed haunted by the shade of one of their friends. There can be little question that all wish their friends happy, but very few care for their company once they have passed into the great unknown.

As an explanation of this fear a number of theories may be suggested. In primitive man fear and hatred would seem to be stronger than their opposites. As Wilson says, “we are compelled to admit that, in primeval life, men must have survived very largely because of the acuteness of their sense of danger.” (49:360.) There were many more dangers to be encountered, diseases were more likely to be fatal, warfare was more frequent, starvation itself might often be imminent. With so many dangers it is not surprising if primitive man paid more

attention to what was hostile to him than to what favored him, and as he believed firmly that the dead were still alive and able to aid or to injure him it was natural enough that he should fear the ghosts of his enemies, but why should he fear the ghosts of his friends? This is the puzzling part of the problem.

Fuerbach offers a very suggestive theory to account for this. In the lowest tribes of primitive men death never takes place naturally, so that when a man dies he is always killed by the sorcery of an enemy. It is very natural then that he should be angry at having been violently removed from the pleasures of life. He would be jealous of all the living and would be very angry at his kinsmen if they did not avenge his death and properly mourn at his demise. (17:231sq.) Naturally then the living feared him.

Freud, similarly, explains this fear as growing out of the ambivalence of feelings which is so strong among primitive men. On the one hand there is real sorrow at the death of a friend, but on the other hand there is always a certain amount of joy due to more or less unconscious hatred. This causes on the one hand a sense of guilt at having wished for the death of the deceased and from the feeling that he was not justly treated while alive, and on the other hand it results in the projection of the enmity for the dead so that they are regarded as demons. (24:48sq.)

Other influences probably go to strengthen those already mentioned. Fear of the dead may result from associating the fear of death with the thought of the dead. A more important reason is that the ghost both in dreams and in illusions is most likely to be seen at night when, as Chamberlain has shown, fear is most easily aroused in man. (7:19sq.) If the ghost retained something of the ghastliness of the corpse the effect would necessarily be heightened. The unknown, the unusual, the unforeseen, the mysterious always has strong potentialities for causing fear and the more so among the ignorant who believe the worst of imaginable possibilities. To think of a man as dead is to think of him in an exceedingly mystifying state and so the fear of the unknown is added to any other fears that may be connected with the dead. Taken together I think the reasons given above will explain the greater part of the

fears that man has of the dead. That these fears are ungrounded is generally accepted by all,—at least during the hours of day.

The next problem we have to consider is the nature of the beliefs as to the fate of the departed. We have found that all primitive men believe in life after death but few if any of them believe in real immortality in another world. The other world is not at first regarded as either a very good one or a very bad one. The shade may only wander about through his old haunts, he may be in an underworld, or in a distant country, but in any case his life is supposed to be distinctly inferior to the life he lived before death. After a time this second life comes to an end,—generally by the soul being born again as a human infant, as an animal, or even as a plant.

This belief in reincarnation is very extensive: it is found in the religion of many primitive tribes at one extreme and in so philosophical a religion as Buddhism at the other. Some of the best studies of the belief have been made among the natives of Australia,—as an example of which we may take the account given by Spencer and Gillen of the belief of the Arunta. This tribes believes that every man has two souls, a racial and an individual one. The racial soul, *Arumburinga*, is changeless and eternal and serves as a sort of guardian spirit. The individual soul, *Ulthana*, is the real personality. At death the former of these souls rejoins the totem group; the latter one haunts the burial place for a time, visits the camp at night injuring its enemies, but on the completion of the mourning ceremonies it returns to the *Arumburinga* spirits and waits for the time when it is born again as an infant. (40:514sq.) Every infant born is a reincarnation of some person that has died. According to Durkheim, Strehlow gives a somewhat different account from that given by Spencer and Gillen. He agrees that every conception takes place through the agency of the ancestral spirits but there is not a direct reincarnation in the way in which Spencer and Gillen suppose. Instead of being reincarnated the soul of the dead man returns to his tribe at the birth of an infant to act as guardian for it until it has become strong. After two or three of these trips back to his tribe the ghost dies the second death and that is the last of him. (13:357.)

Stefanson reports a belief similar to the one just given. Speaking of the Mackenzie River Eskimos, he says, "every man

has two souls, the one with which he was born and the one he acquired immediately after birth. He may, in fact, have more souls than that. If three people, or thirteen, have died just before the child was born, then he gets three guardian spirits, or thirteen, according to circumstances. But when he dies it is none of these acquired souls, but the soul that he was born with, which in its turn remains four or five days in the house after death, which is then ceremoniously driven out to the grave, and which waits there until it is summoned to become the second soul of a new born child. No one knows what becomes of the guardian spirit after the death of the persons whose guardians they have been. I have repeatedly asked about it, but no one seems to have ever heard the matter discussed and no one seemed to think the question was of great importance." (42: 401sq.)

Beliefs not essentially different from the above are to be found among most primitive peoples. The myths as to the origin of death very frequently indicate a strong belief in reincarnation. Death is considered to be the price paid for offspring: the individual dies but through his descendants the tribe continues. Individual death is the price paid for plasmic immortality. As Durkheim has said,—“There is, as it were, a germ plasm of a mystical order, which is transmitted from generation to generation, and which preserves, or at least is supposed to preserve, the spiritual unity of the tribe through the ages. And this belief, in spite of its symbolical character, is not without objective truth. For if the group is not immortal in the absolute sense of the word, it is nevertheless true that it survives the individuals and is reborn and reincarnated at each new generation.” (13:385.)

The belief in reincarnation has appeared in many forms. It has not been limited to man, nor even to the lower animals but in some cases has been made to apply even to inanimate objects, but when we consider the animistic tendencies of primitive man this is hardly surprising. It is sufficient for our purpose to attempt to interpret the belief as applied to man and to this we shall now turn.

One theory of the origin of the belief in human reincarnation is that it grows out of the resemblance of infants to dead relatives. Primitive man, seeing this resemblance, supposes that

the deceased has returned to life again in the infant. That there is much in favor of this theory is evident and it agrees well with the other theories.

Durkheim explains the belief among the Australians by pointing out that these natives do not understand how conception takes place, and he says, "Primitive man does not have the idea of an omnipotent God who makes souls out of nothing." (13: 384.) The only way an infant can get a soul then is for someone to die and leave his soul free to begin life over again. That there is much in favor of this argument we must admit, but it is the wish that is at the bottom of the belief: the other reasons mentioned are secondary.

When a member of a tribe dies there is the desire to have him back in the tribe again and especially so if he was a brave warrior. In such a case it would require very little ground for the savage to believe that the dead had returned to life. If a son of the warrior showed the qualities of his father it would very readily be believed that the father's soul was animating the son. The savage, accustomed to mysteries, finds almost anything credible. In the cases mentioned of the father's soul being reincarnated in his eldest son and the grandfather's in the favorite grandchild we have very clear evidences of the working of the wish. Civilized fathers and grandfathers often feel that their very souls are in their children and in case of the savage who believes that the soul is a separable being and is able to get along without the body it would be very easy to suppose that it had changed residences. In considering the forces that have made man superior to the animals we found the parental instinct of fundamental importance. It would be surprising under such circumstances if primitive parents did not feel that their life continued in the lives of their children. At any rate we have the facts of parental affection and belief in reincarnation. The reader may judge for himself as to whether their relation is or is not a causal one.

Closely related to the belief in reincarnation is the belief in resurrection. In religions of all kinds we find the belief that the dead are at times brought to life again. Great men have been supposed to die, be buried, and rise again. What is it that produces this belief in resurrection? It must of course be accounted for by some natural tendency of

the mind, but this does not seem so difficult. To the most intelligent death is hard to grasp, and in case of neurotics it often becomes an impossibility. The insane are often unable to believe that the dead are dead. The image of a person as living may become an obsession, a fixed idea. It may be impossible to get rid of it. Under such circumstances the recurrence to consciousness of the idea of the person being alive added to a half-realization of the fact of death may produce the belief in resurrection. In normal people the thought of a loved one as dead is intolerable and the preservation from despair may demand an ambivalent resurgence of hope that the dead will return to life. Under such circumstances the belief in resurrection may readily arise if the feelings hold too great sway over the intellect. It is in accord with this view that the heroes and great men have most often been supposed to be restored to life again because their loss is felt so deeply. The motives for the belief in reincarnation and resurrection are then very similar.

From our consideration of the belief in reincarnation it is then clear that in the mind of primitive man a future life was not assumed for the benefit of the individual but for the benefit of the race if for the benefit of anyone; the desire so clearly apparent is not for personal immortality in a spirit world but for racial immortality, for personal immortality in offspring, i. e., for plasmic immortality. In this primitive man is but expressing the parental instinct, the strength of which has so steadily increased with evolution. This has of course worked for the most part unconsciously but none the less effectively. The belief in personal survival is a later development, as is also the idea of reward and punishment for the deeds of the earthly life. To the development of these we shall now turn.

Before the belief in personal immortality could develop personality had first to arise, and as Chamberlain says, "It took ages to make mind, ages again to make man, still other ages to make personality." (6:278.) Not only this, but it was necessary that the individual should be remembered for a long period of time if he was to be considered immortal. It could come then only after primitive man had lost his belief that an injury to his image was an injury to himself. Before this time art was not allowed to develop and in the absence of some kind of an objective image the memory of a man rapidly weakened and

died. With the development of painting and sculpture it became possible to preserve the memory of a man through long periods of time, and as men were remembered for a longer time they came to be believed immortal. (6:278.) Crawley and Feuerbach, as we have seen, have also shown the relation of the image to the belief in immortality and Crawley points out that as a matter of fact it is the "heroes," the men who are remembered longest, who are first supposed to be immortal. When we consider that in many savage tribes there is still the belief that the possession of a man's picture gives one a peculiar power over him, it is not surprising that the belief in personal immortality is absent among them.

In the higher religions the other world comes to be primarily a place for rewarding or punishing a man for the deeds of this life. This idea is entirely absent in the most primitive religions and it never appears in any of them to the extent that it does in the religions of more civilized peoples. Its appearance presupposes a higher development of the ethical consciousness than is found in the lowest tribes.

Let us next consider several cases of the belief in a judgment in the next world. Rivers gives an account of one of the simplest kind in the belief of the Todas. There is another world, Amnòdr, which lies below this one. The spirits of the dead in going there must cross on a thread the river Pürvûrkin; if they have been just and good in their life they are able to get over but if they have been evil they fall into the river and are bitten by leeches for a period of time proportionate to their misdeeds. When this is over they proceed to join the good in Amnòdr. They do not remain there always but after a time are reborn into the world. (35:397sq.) Codrington reports a more developed belief in Banks' Islands. When a man dies he goes to Panoi. If he is good he is allowed to enter the part where the ghosts live in harmony with each other but if he is wicked he must remain in the bad part of Panoi; and "those who remain in the bad place quarrel and die in misery, not in physical pain indeed, but restless, wandering back to earth, homeless, malignant, pitiable;" (9:274sq.) Here too we see the ghosts finally die. In the most primitive ideas of the future life the other world is like this only not so good; men follow much the same occupations as they did in life. From such

ideas was evolved the mediaeval belief that the next world is so far superior to this that the stay on earth is considered as a period of trial and suffering. In savage belief, however, the other world is generally inferior to this one, but as the ethical motive which appears in the examples given is of great importance in the later development of the belief in personal immortality we should note briefly its basis.

Plato showed that the desire for justice is a strong element of the character of every good man and motivates much of our conduct. Kant, following in this line of thought, showed that in this world justice is not done, that the evil flourish while the just suffer; but since human nature demands that justice be done to all, that goodness and happiness, evil and misery, should go together, man instinctively tends to believe that there is another world in which justice is meted out to all. According to Kant then the desire for justice is the basis of the belief in personal immortality. In primitive tribes this cannot be true as we have found because there is generally very little if any difference in the treatment received by the good and the bad in the other world. The part it plays in other religions we shall note later.

As for the desire for influential immortality in primitive tribes very little definite can be said. Primitive men generally have very little room for individual distinction as compared to men of civilized societies. There were few things of importance that they did where they were not constantly confronted with the inflexible customs and taboos of their group. Their range of free action was thus very much limited. But even if this was true it must be said that in general primitive men showed the greatest respect for the beliefs of their group; they were not found wanting in a willingness to sacrifice their lives, if occasion demanded it, for the welfare of the group, and this—if I mistake not—is one of the strongest possible evidences of the desire for influential immortality. So I think that even in the most primitive tribes we find to some extent the desire for all three types of immortality but by far the greatest of these is the desire for plasmic immortality.

To summarize what seem to be primitive man's beliefs on the subject of death and immortality: All deaths are at first supposed to be due to a supernatural cause. The dead are supposed

to live on for a time after death very much as they lived during life and are intensely feared by the living. It would even seem that to primitive man the dead cause more terror than does death itself. There is generally no long life in the other world; real belief in personal immortality is the exception rather than the rule among primitive men. There is a very widespread belief that the dead are reincarnated,—that the individual perishes but that the tribe survives. The most important sources of the belief in a future life are the inability of the mind to grasp the fact of death and the altruistic wish to know that dead friends are happy. The belief in a judgment in the next world is not a factor of importance in regulating conduct in this life.

To complete our survey of the phylogenetic development of the attitude toward death and the belief in immortality we shall review briefly the beliefs as they have appeared in the different religions that have been held by the more civilized peoples. In this way we can more accurately estimate the validity of the conclusions already reached with respect to primitive man.

In taking up the beliefs about death and the future life as they have appeared in the more developed religions of the world we naturally expect to find many variations in the details of the beliefs but these need not prevent us from determining the answers to our two fundamental problems as to the relative natural strengths of the desires for personal, plasmic and influential immortality and as to the relative values of these for motivating moral conduct; for while beliefs will naturally differ among different peoples, the original nature of these different peoples can not differ greatly and an analysis of the varying beliefs and their sources should show which of the various motives are naturally strongest. Keeping this object in view let us pass in review the teachings of the different religions insofar as they relate to our problem.

The beliefs held by the more civilized peoples as to the nature of the soul and of death and their burial and mourning customs are of little importance for us because of their general similarity to those of primitive peoples. In nearly all the religions we find the belief in a duality of body and soul. Still in popular belief the soul is seldom considered to be immaterial.

In some cases we find the shadow considered to be the soul as among the Egyptians, in other cases the blood is the soul as among the Hebrews. (Deut. 12:23.) The belief in several souls is less frequent but is found at times. The conception of death likewise agrees well with primitive beliefs; the soul may be supposed to stay for a time with the body as was the case with the Egyptians, the Greeks and the Romans; but more commonly it is supposed to leave the body at death and depart for another world or perhaps roam about on earth. There is nothing especially novel about the conceptions of the more civilized peoples. With an increase in civilization mourning customs have in general become more sane. The Hebrews, for example, early prohibited cutting and mutilating the body as a sign of grief. (Deut. 14:1.) We still find, however, the primitive practice continued in the widespread custom of wearing mourning, though it has of course lost its primitive importance. It is no longer—let us hope—intended to pacify the ghost. In Oriental religions we still find some rather barbarous practices but generally they have declined with civilization. Burial customs have in general been determined by the belief as to the future state. In Egypt, where one of the souls was supposed to inhabit the body and where the body may have been supposed to rise again in this world after a long period of time, we find the practice of mummification. In Christian lands where the belief in bodily resurrection exists we find inhumation the general practice and hostility to cremation rather general. An examination of other beliefs shows similar agreement. Many primitive practices still remain,—as, for example, the custom of carrying the corpse feet foremost, although the fear that started the custom has ceased. Without going further into details we may, I think, pass over the beliefs and customs so far mentioned with the assurance that they contain nothing to disprove the conclusions reached as a result of the study of similar beliefs and customs among primitive men.

When, however, we turn to a study of the beliefs relating to a future life as they have appeared among the more civilized peoples we find great differences and it will be necessary for us to examine them in greater detail. This we shall now attempt to do by taking up each of the more important religions separately and attempting to determine just what they have be-

lieved about the future life and also what have been the sources of this belief.

The Religion of the Hebrews. The beliefs of the early Hebrews on the subject of the future life have been the subject of endless discussion but a consideration of the references to the subject indicates that their belief did not differ greatly from that of the native Australians of to-day. Thus Jacob, lamenting the supposed death of Joseph, says, "I will go down to Sheol to my son mourning." (Gen. 37:35.) It is said of Abraham that he "gave up the ghost . . . and was gathered to his people." (Gen. 25:8.) These passages indicate strongly, if they do not prove, that the Hebrews believed that at death the soul went to an underworld to continue its existence. There is little reason for believing, however, that at this time there was a belief in personal immortality.

The immortality that the early Hebrews did believe in was not the immortality of the soul in another world; "the futurity that presented itself to their minds," says W. J. Fox, "was a futurity to be realized by their descendants, or their fellow creatures, in this our world." (Works, VII. 223.) In many ways it appears that the early Hebrew desired and believed in immortality through his descendants rather than personal immortality in another world. This appears from the words of Jehovah: "I Jehovah thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, upon the third and upon the fourth generation of them that hate me, . . ." (Exod. 20:5.) When the covenant is made with Abraham it is not a promise of eternal life for him personally but that his seed shall be in number as the dust of the earth and shall have a vast territory forever. (Gen. 13:15sq.) It was the belief that a man had no future life without posterity that made possible the sin and death of Onan for refusing to raise up seed to his brother. (Gen. 38:8sq.) I think then we are safe in concluding that the immortality most believed in and desired by the ancient Hebrews was what we have called plasmic immortality.

It was not before the second century B. C. that a very strong belief in personal immortality was found among the Hebrews. (8:244.) In the first century B. C. it began to appear strongly thus furnishing an easy transition to the belief of the early

Christians. It is probable that the belief in the resurrection of the body was the result of Egyptian influence because the Hebrews can hardly have escaped being influenced by the customs in which they were thrown during the exile. With the belief in personal immortality we shall deal later: it is sufficient to have shown that during the greater part of Old Testament history the immortality believed in and worked for by the Hebrews was the immortality of an endless line of offspring.

The Religion of the Early Greeks. The beliefs of the early Greeks respecting the future life were in general very similar to those of primitive peoples. According to Homer there is an underworld, a dreary place, where the souls of all go and are treated very much alike; but according to Pindar this dreary underworld is only for the wicked while there is another world where the good go and are very happy. (28:518.) It seems that the former of these views was the one most generally accepted by the people. The future life was not generally regarded as pleasant nor at first was it supposed to be endless. The kind of immortality that the early Greeks really believed in may be best understood by the following quotation from Harrison:

"The myths of the *heroes* of Athens, from Cecrops to Theseus, show them as kings, that is as functionaries, and, in primitive times, these functionaries assume snake-form. The daimon-functionary represents the permanent life of the group. The individual dies, but the group and its incarnation the king survive. *Le roi est mort, vive the roi*. From these two facts, of group permanency and individual death, arose the notion of reincarnation, *palingenesia*." (26:xiv.) If space permitted it would be possible to give much additional evidence to show that the Greeks placed much more emphasis on plasmic and influential immortality than they did on personal immortality.

In its later development, however, Greek beliefs are influenced—among the educated classes at least—by the development of speculative thought. But since speculation does not succeed so well in reaching unified results as do the slow processes of the folk soul a number of contradictory theories arose. Epicurus and his school denied personal immortality, the Pythagoreans held the theory of metempsychosis, and Plato was an advocate of personal immortality. The Greek religion came to place more

emphasis on personality but it lost little of its social character. Even the Olympians, the individualistic gods, were governed by Themis, a symbol of herd instinct. (26:485.) But with the rise of philosophy the religion began to lose its distinctive character as a national religion and we may well neglect its later development.

The Religion of the Romans. The beliefs of the early Romans were typical of primitive men. By the time Roman civilization had reached its height, however, a change had come about. The common people believed in a future life where rewards and punishments would be meted out. Not so with the educated classes; Catullus probably represents their belief most accurately when he describes death as "nox perpetua dormienda." Juvenal says that in his day even the children no longer believed in the underworld. It is evident that belief in personal immortality was not strong in Rome. "In each case it is life, not death, that is of interest to the living; death is rather a negation than anything distinctly realized." (19:392.)

Christianity. On first thought Christianity seems in many respects to be the antithesis of the religions so far discussed. Instead of teaching racial and influential immortality it has often advocated celibacy as the ideal of conduct—hence voluntary race suicide as the end of human existence on earth—and, in the same spirit, it has often inculcated a spirit of scorn for this world and its affairs and the opinions of mere men. Christianity has, in short, tended to turn its back on this world—as if it were hopelessly bad—and has taught men to look forward to a future life for their happiness. In so doing it seems to negate the desires which we have found to be fundamental in other religions. However, before we are in position to state conclusions we must examine more closely the sources of the Christian doctrines and note what forces have been active in producing the spread of Christianity.

Though apparently a new religion Christianity retained many elements from the older natural religions. Jesus seems to have accepted the doctrine of immortality as it was found in the beliefs of the Hebrews, the Greeks and some of the Oriental peoples. The belief in the resurrection of the body is in all probability to be credited to Egyptian influence. (10:331.) It is this that has caused inhumation to be so tenaciously retained

as a mode of burial. Many Christians still believe that at the last day the body will come forth from the grave, and so quite naturally they object to destroying it by cremation. In the account of the birth of Jesus we see a survival of the primitive beliefs regarding conception. In the doctrine of salvation we find the symbol of rebirth. It represents the deeply rooted desire for reincarnation. Christians and primitive men alike agree that to be immortal one must be born again. Along with this we see the traces of ancestor worship and the strong feeling of tribal unity in the doctrines of the fatherhood of God and the universal brotherhood of man. Not infrequently it is true Christianity has put a premium on individualism but altruistic love, sympathy, and aid have also been prominent. We are reminded that "whosoever will save his life shall lose it." Social duties have generally received great emphasis. It is these elements having a strong hold on the human heart because of their place in the development of the phylum that I am convinced have made for the permanency of Christianity. Yet in view of the emphasis on celibacy and on personal immortality with everlasting reward or everlasting punishment in a lake of fire it is evident that other forces have been working to produce the spread of Christianity. To an investigation of these we shall now turn.

Ignorance and credulity were of course necessary as a basis for these doctrines but they alone could not well have produced such results. Other forces were necessary and one of these was the development of priests and rulers of superior intelligence. There can be little question that in large part the belief in eternal punishment was produced in order to control more easily the common people and it was transferred to Christianity with all its barbaric harshness. It was the more effective because of the belief then common—and apparently held by Jesus himself—that the end of the world was near. The psychological effect of this was obvious, although it would be incorrect probably to say that the doctrine was invented solely for this effect. From another standpoint the belief in future punishment as well as future reward must be regarded as due in part to the wish for them. As Scott says,—“In days when enmity was wider spread, we find hell wider spread, and almost a necessity to present satisfaction. In some cases, indeed, the

joys of heaven were to consist partly in listening to the howls of the wicked, i. e., other people who are offensive to the imaginer." (38: 111.) This appears in the sermons of Jonathan Edwards and other instances showing this element of the belief have been cited by Tollemache. (46:41.) It is no more unnatural that one should wish an enemy to be punished than that one should wish happiness for a friend. To a much smaller degree perhaps the belief results from the desire that justice be done to all to atone for the injustice of this world. As this source of the belief has been much emphasized we may well examine it more closely.

Originally, as I think Durkheim has shown, the belief in a future life was not related to moral ideas in any direct way. The moralizing of the next world was a later addition. (13: 382.) But with the higher development of the ethical consciousness it came to be realized with increasing vividness that justice is not done to all in this world; virtue is not always rewarded with happiness, nor is vice always punished with misery. Man's sense of justice recoils from the thought that this must ever remain so and demands that there be another life in which all shall secure their just deserts. Where this belief is held together with the belief in a just and all-powerful God, it furnishes the strongest possible basis for faith in personal immortality. This argument has been most forcibly stated by Kant. It is of course only a specific form of the argument from the wish and has the same validity. Under certain conditions it is a factor of great importance but, as history shows, the part played by the future world in the development of religion often makes it impossible to suppose that it results from any sentiment that could be called ethical. Thus the Mohammedans believe in a future life for men where they are rewarded or punished but they do not believe in a future life for women. Yet women are the most zealous of the Mohammedans.

Those who demand a future life in the name of justice are simply showing their belief that every man should live a just and happy life on earth,—if he is deprived of this they desire to give him another chance. They emphasize the living of the full life; the immortality aspect is logically secondary. It is the means and not the end.

Once the belief grows up that this world is only a place of trial and suffering intended as a test and a preparation for a future life and that those who most fully deny their natural impulses will receive the greatest reward, we should expect those fanatics who accept most enthusiastically the doctrine to deny even the strongest impulses and this they did with the result that the vow of celibacy was considered most meritorious. So we see in the very renunciation of marriage and children the strongest proof of their natural regard for them. From our point of view this is a fact of the greatest significance because it is the natural desire of man that concerns us and not what he can be caused to do by taking advantage of his ignorance, fears, and excessive credulity.

If then we have justly interpreted the sources of the Christian belief in personal immortality it appears that in Christianity, as well as in the other religions reviewed, the natural desire for and faith in a future life is weaker than the desire for earthly immortality. In the present time with the rapid spread of education and the consequent decrease in superstition the abnormal aspects of Christianity are being forgotten; society is endeavoring to make this life worth while and to remedy evils here instead of leaving them to the mercy of God and the possibility of correction in another world. In so doing we are expressing again the ideal of racial immortality, and we are making the life of the individual better and happier than ever before.

Oriental Religions. In none of the leading Oriental religions do we find any strong belief in personal immortality. Their faith is limited almost entirely to plasmic and influential immortality. This we may see by examining several of the leading religions.

The attitude of Confucius toward the question of death was that of the agnostic,—thus his question, “While you do not know life, how can you know about death?” (Chinese Classics, tr. by Legge, 7th ed., I, 185.) If we may accept the testimony of Parker the beliefs of the Chinamen of to-day do not differ greatly from those taught by Confucius. Parker says: “There is no dread of death, except in so far as it is painful and a sad severance. Though the Buddhist stories of Heaven and Hell are freely repeated, no Chinaman seriously believes them, nor is

his conduct ever motivated, as it is with Christians, by hopes and fears of what may happen in a future life." (Studies in Chinese Religion, London, 1910, p. 12.) The Chinese do, however, emphasize the importance of posterity: it is the greatest of misfortunes to die without a son. The Chinese religion also recognizes the importance of influential immortality.

Similarly Shinto and Bushido do not teach personal immortality but place great emphasis on plasmic and influential immortality. The moral heredity of a family is one of its strongest forces and to preserve the family line and its traditions is the most sacred of duties. It is this spirit of duty to the group that has enabled the Japanese—without hope in a future life—fearlessly to face death. A more striking case of man's desire for influential immortality rather than life itself could hardly be given. The readiness of the Japanese to die for their country is well known—we should not forget the real source of their bravery.

The belief of the Brahmins with respect to the future life is expressed by the doctrine of the *karman*. According to this doctrine every deed of a man's life plays a part in determining the future destiny of his soul, and it is only the effects of his deeds that survive him. The soul itself is immortal but with each reincarnation there is a change of consciousness and no memories are retained from the past life. The immortality of *karman* is then essentially an immortality of influence. In the later period we learn from the Laws of Manu that the Brahmin believed he could not attain eternal happiness unless he had a son to make the proper sacrifices. (Manu, VI. 35.) Plasmic as well as influential immortality was then greatly desired.

In Buddhism celibacy is highly commended and the immortality that the Buddhist strives for is essentially an immortality of influence. This will appear from the following quotation from Shaku: "man's life is not limited to this existence only, and . . . if he thinks, feels, and acts truthfully, nobly, virtuously, unselfishly, he will live forever in these thoughts, sentiments, and works; for anything good, beautiful and true is in accordance with the reason of existence, and is destined to have a life eternal. This is the Buddhist conception of immortality." (Buddhist Conception of Death, *Monist*, Vol. 17, 1907, p. 1.)

It seems safe to say then that the Orientals have not developed very strong faith in a future life in another world. Some desire and believe in plasmic immortality, all seek influential immortality.

We have now passed in review the most important facts relating to the phylogenetic development of the attitude toward death and the types of belief in immortality. We have attempted to give a psychological interpretation to these in order to determine their real significance. The following conclusions seem justified: 1. primitive man's fear of death and the dead is due primarily to his superstitions about the cause of death and the nature of the dead; 2. his belief in a future life for the individual does not result primarily from a desire for such a life but rather from his inability to grasp the fact of death; 3. the immortality desired by primitive man is racial rather than personal and appears with greatest force in the belief in reincarnation; 4. in higher civilizations the belief in personal immortality appears and survives largely through the agency of the priests but no religion long succeeds in remaining vital if it does not emphasize the social aspects of life,—the altruistic aspect of the attitude toward death appears strongly in the strength of the desire for plasmic and influential rather than personal immortality; and 5. conduct is generally found to be motivated more by the desire for plasmic and influential immortality than by the desire for personal immortality.

To throw more light on our problem we may now turn to the development of the attitude toward death and the belief in immortality as it appears in the individual.

THE ONTOGENETIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATTITUDE TOWARD DEATH AND THE BELIEF IN IMMORTALITY.

The very young child's idea of natural death seems to correspond very closely to the Melanesian idea of it as expressed by the word *mate*. Natural death is not an event but a state or condition. The very old are partly dead; they cannot run and play as the child does; when they do die they are not supposed to be fully dead for some time. (Cf. 38:88sq.) The abstract idea of death is of course impossible for the child. So when children wish people dead, as they sometimes do, it is not so bad as it seems,—they only wish the offensive person out of

sight. The thought of death is, in fact, not necessarily unpleasant to the child: funerals may even be interesting and pleasant events. (38:93.)

The fear of death can hardly be considered as instinctive. As Ferrero points out, children do not fear death *per se* (16:361sq.) This fear must be acquired from experience. (38:118sq., 25:223, 14:31.) Stekel's conclusion that all fear is fear of death does not seem then to hold.

The natural ideas of children with reference to the nature of the dead are difficult to secure because of the instruction received from parents and teachers. Nevertheless we do know a few things of value. Children, like primitive men, ascribe life to inanimate things and to a greater degree to the dead; they often think of them as having smother feelings, being asleep, cold, feeling the damp and the rain, wanting to turn, being tired, lonesome; they often fear they have been buried alive, etc. (38:97.) The belief that the dead are alive in their graves must be considered as a natural one while the belief that the dead have gone to heaven is to be credited mostly to the influences of instruction.

For the most detailed study of children's ideas about immortality we are indebted to Street. From the data at his disposal he concludes that children have very undeveloped ideas as to the nature of the soul and the future life. Their attitude toward heaven was not very favorable. Only one fourth of them desired to go to heaven, the others preferred to remain on earth. In those cases it appeared that heaven was desired because some loved one was supposed to be there rather than because heaven was supposed to be in other respects more desirable than earth. The question of rewards and punishment does not seem to have affected the attitude toward a future life very much. (44:283sq.) In 80% of the cases the belief in immortality was credited to the instruction received in religion. Among those who doubted the existence of a future life boys were more numerous. (44:285.) This study shows then very clearly that the child does not desire a future life ordinarily,—he is far more concerned with the life of earth and regards it as more satisfactory. In this he at least agrees with primitive men, and perhaps with a majority of those who are civilized. And when he does think of death he thinks of it from the altruistic

point of view. If he commits suicide it is for the effect it will have on others.

In early childhood we have found little fear of death but from the age of seven there is a fairly gradual rise in the curve until the age of thirteen or fourteen when as Dr. Hall says,—“The horror of death seems most intense in the years just preceding the great altruistic tide of adolescence.” (25:223.) In describing this fear he says,—“Dread of death is apt to focus, now on fear of crape, . . . on the creepy feeling of worms, being buried alive and being nailed in, . . . etc. The young are apt to fear death for themselves, the old for others. Only 11 reported specific fears of hell. In nine cases religion has removed fear of death, but in far more of our returns it has caused or increased it.” (25:223.) From this period when fear is greatest until the age of about twenty there is, according to Scott, a decline in the fear of death; at twenty there is a rather quick drop in the curve for a short time, followed by a gradual decline until the beginning of the period of old age when the curve rises gradually until death. (38:109.) I do not regard the latter part of this statement as established but that is to be discussed later. We shall now turn to the period of adolescence.

Adolescence is pre-eminently the period of the dawn of altruism and love, and this is of the greatest significance in determining the general mental attitude in other directions, especially in religion; for, as Dr. Hall says,—“Psychologically, religion and love rise and degenerate together. One test of an age, race, or civilization is to keep these two as near as love and death are to each other, and in as wholesome relations.” (Adolescence, II., 126.)

It is in adolescence then that we should expect to find the first great awakening to the vital problems of life. The studies of religion made during the past two decades show conclusively that it is at this period that religion takes its rise. Among nearly all peoples initiation, confirmation, and conversion are characteristic of adolescence, and while among Protestants conversion has tended to lose much of its proper significance, it still remains true that with the development of physical and mental powers during adolescence, the youth or maiden accepts the customs and beliefs of the group,—which in Christian societies means of

course the acceptance of the belief in immortality, for whatever is the customary belief in any group is almost invariably accepted by the adolescent. We see then that the acceptance of the belief implies an acceptance of social responsibilities rather than a desire for eternal life in another world. The importance of this is exceedingly great in estimating the value of the belief as a stimulus to moral conduct. Its value as a control rests more on its relation to social than to individualistic feelings.

Some light has been thrown on the adolescent attitude toward death by the study of suicide. There are very few who at this age do not at some time consider self-destruction. Scott found in his investigation that only 7% of those reporting had not at some time in their life thought of self-destruction. (38:98.) The ages for which this was most generally reported ranged from twelve to seventeen. The actual number who do at this age commit suicide is of course not very great but it is the motive for it in which we are primarily concerned.

According to Adler suicide grows out of a strong feeling of *Minderwertigkeit* and a stormy effort at over-compensation. This leads to suicide in order to cause pain to relatives, friends and lovers and force them to recognize the worth of the deceased. The feeling of *Minderwertigkeit* itself is very often due to uncertainty as to the future sex rôle. (1:356sq.) Ferrero also held that suicide was for the purpose of causing sorrow to loved ones. (16:364.) Eulenburg collected data regarding suicides of persons under twenty and of those cases where the cause could be learned more than half in case of females and a smaller number in case of males were due to misfortunes in love. (15.) In a number of cases lovers died together. On the mental side it must be admitted that death can become agreeable by having agreeable ideas associated with it. (16:366.) Further evidence of the part played by sexual factors in determining suicide is found in the results of the clinical study made by Pfeiffer. In three fourths of the cases dissection revealed a pathological basis for the suicide while the remaining fourth were evidently not entirely in good condition. (32:108.) In case of the females the sexual organs were in a majority of the cases found to be in a pathological condition. (32:155.) In the face of such evidence it must be admitted that the relation between love and the attitude toward death is very close. If

love is blighted life may cease to be worth living,—the will to live may be destroyed.

We see then how strong is the desire for plasmic as opposed to individual immortality. When the hope of the one is destroyed life itself often ceases to be valued. But this also shows the strength of the desire for influential immortality; for by no means all cases resulting from a feeling of *Minderwertigkeit* are due to sexual defect: many cases are due to a feeling of inability to meet the expectations of the group in which the individual is placed. The hope of attaining influential immortality is lost and with it the desire for life itself tends to disappear. In agreement with this Durkheim says that suicide is essentially a social phenomenon and “varies inversely as the degree of integration of religious, domestic and political society.” (12:222.) When man loses the support of social opinion life is less valuable to him and may become unbearable.

From the above I think it must be granted that the deepest desires of the adolescent relate to earth rather than heaven, to plasmic and influential immortality rather than personal.

With the passing of the period of growth there is of course the probability that ideas and beliefs will become static if they do not interfere with life. In case of a belief that has the sanction of society this probability is greatly increased. We should naturally expect then that once the belief in personal immortality has been accepted as a result of religious instruction it would ordinarily continue to be held for the remaining part of life. If it were a vital part of the spiritual life of a group we should not expect to find it weakening with the increase in age and the consequent approach of the time when the belief should be more vitally felt. Yet in many cases the belief weakens. Accurate statistics cannot be had to show exactly the comparative strengths of the belief at different ages but the following table from Scott is very suggestive:

	Ages	-16	16-20	20-40	40-
Believe in a future life.		95%	75%	63%	60%
Do not believe in it.		5	7	31	30
Not given	18	6	10
(38:104.)					

From the above we see that with the approach of old age the number of believers in a future life steadily decreased. Simi-

larly studies made on college students show a decay in the belief during the last years of college. (29 and 41.) This is not difficult to understand: the intellectual elements of the belief are often destroyed by the study of science and philosophy, and scepticism follows. The greater variability of the male appears here in the fact that men doubt religious dogmas more often than do women. The important thing in this connection appears in the fact that the devotion for the supernatural tends to be transferred to the race. Apparently doubt with respect to heaven gives greater faith in man and things earthly.

With the increase in age there is a steady increase in the relative number of suicides, at least up to the age of about seventy when there seems to be a slight drop in the proportion. (43:181sq.) As Strahan, Durkheim and others have shown the rate does not seem to be greatly influenced by religious beliefs and fears. What it does now, I think, is a decrease in the will to live. From the period of maturity our strength and vitality tend to diminish. Very often this is accompanied by an increase in physical pains and dependent mental distress, and, as the Freudians have shown, each pain weakens the strength of the will to live. The discouraged lover is far more willing to meet death than is the successful one. The chronic dyspeptic may find life unendurable while his friend with a good digestion is full of the joy of life. Life is by no means unconditionally desirable, and the dread of death as co-function of the love of life is subject to the same conditions of increase and decrease in strength. An excellent illustration of the working of this principle is found in Abraham's psycho-analytical study of Segantini. The latter's misfortunes and sorrows had prepared him to face death without fear if not with pleasure.

This decrease in the strength of the will to live has also very close relation to the sexual life. If we neglect the period of childhood we find that the period of greatest sexual activity is characterized by the smallest number of suicides and as sexual activity declines suicides increase. This is only one of the many evidences of the close relation between sex and death. Witness, for example, the adolescent's fears, or the despair of those for whom love has been blighted by venereal disease—no despair could be greater. It is only in proportion as love is kept strong that life is valued.

Some writers go so far as to hold that man should with the approach of natural death have an instinctive desire for it. Thus Metchnikoff in the "Prolongation of Life" (N. Y., 1907, p. 125), says: "It would be natural if, just as in sleep there is an instinctive desire for rest, so also the natural death of man were preceded by an instinctive wish for it." That a real desire for death seldom appears before natural death must be admitted perhaps, but that death inspires terror in the aged has not been demonstrated. On the contrary Bazelaire de Ruppierre, who made a careful study of the fears of the aged, states that death is generally peaceful. (4:61.) Nothnagel reaches the same conclusion. (30:48.) Whether or not a positive desire for death appears with age it seems certain that fear of death weakens.

The problem as to the kind of immortality most desired by the aged is a very difficult one to solve. According to Runze, "The desire for earthly immortality seems more characteristic of senescence than of the activity and religious enthusiasm of youth." (37:49.) But whether this is a correct statement of the case or not we cannot at present say. The evidence, however, indicates that it is.

As Egger has emphasized, the young have had few experiences to look back on with pride, their 'self' is less developed, their career lies mostly in the future, and consequently they tend to live in an ideal world, which is also a future world, where their hopes will be realized. Not so with the aged, their life has been long and filled with many experiences, their consciousness of self is highly developed, their aspirations have been for the most part attained or abandoned, they live not in the future but in the past. (14:32.) In so far as this is true—and I think we cannot doubt that it is largely so—the young must not be supposed to desire earthly immortality so much as do the aged. The youth with his confident idealism dreams of fabulous worlds of the future, while the man of long experience is more realistic and is content with earth.

Finally, as regards the aged, it can not well be denied that they tend to live in the deeds of their children. They are willing to make every kind of sacrifice to promote the welfare and happiness of those who continue the family line. The tie that binds child to parent may be, and often is, weak but the

tie that binds parent to child is one of the strongest by which the human heart can be bound. Normally the parent is not half so much concerned about a future life for himself in another world as he is concerned about the life of his child in this world. His deepest desire is not for personal immortality but for plasmic immortality. In individuals yet more altruistic we find a devotion not merely to one's family but to a larger social group or even to the human race as a whole. In such cases we find that the immortality most desired is that of works. The individual desires to accomplish something for the good of the race: his striving is not for personal immortality but for an immortality of influence.

If then we have correctly interpreted the desire for immortality as it appears during the different periods of life it seems safe to say that the desire for personal immortality influences conduct much less than does the desire for the other types of immortality. Before concluding our study of the ontogenetic development of the attitude toward death it is fitting that we attempt an analysis of the mental state when in the presence of death itself. To this we shall now turn.

In the mind of the average man death is supposed to be painful and distressing. Yet this is very seldom true. In the majority of cases death takes place only after a person has become unconscious and so neither pain nor distress can be felt. Studies made by Osler (31:19), Finot (18:225sq.), Bazelaire de Ruppierre (4:61), and Nothnagel (30:48sq.) show conclusively that both physical pain and mental distress—even in case of culprits—are nearly always absent in actual death though of course the sickness leading up to death may be painful. Even the irreligious die peacefully. Thus the Rev. J. Warton writes, "I am shocked, and my blood runs cold within me, when I hear, as I too often do, of the greatest of sinners, with no time for solid repentance, quitting the world with all the religious assurance of the greatest of saints; dying, in short, in the worst of causes as if they died in the very best." (47:252.)

The idea of death doubtless plays its part in making death terrible under some circumstances but there is reason to believe that such cases are rare. To Egger we are indebted for a careful study of the experiences of people who have been in great danger of death through drowning, falling from a height,

etc., but have been saved from death. These are not, it has been objected, real experiences of the dying, but there is little reason for supposing that they would have been otherwise if a fortunate chance had not prevented death from really taking place. If a man in water sinks and becomes unconscious but is pulled out and restored to consciousness the value of his testimony as a description of the consciousness of the dying should be as great as though he had really died and given us an account later—supposing of course that this were really possible. At any rate the results are worth consideration.

From the data at his disposal Egger finds that the consciousness of those who think themselves dying is characterized by four conditions: first, there is a sentiment of beatitude, a feeling of indifference and submission to the hand of Fate; second, there is an anaesthesia of touch and no feeling of sadness but unusual acuity of hearing and of sight; third, there is an unusual rapidity of thought and imagination; and fourth, much of one's past life is reviewed and especially one thinks of the effect of his death on loved ones. (14.) The first three of these points agree well with results already considered: here as in the cases reported we find the absence of pain or fear. The fourth point, however, deserves special mention. That much of one's past life is reviewed shows one of the traits most characteristic of consciousness when death is seriously thought of, i. e., the tendency to survey one's career, to ask what it has been worth, to select the dearest memories and take a last look, and finally to think of the loved ones who will be left behind. The accounts often show that the person who thought himself dying was far more concerned over the welfare of his friends than over his own fate.

As Egger points out the extent to which the past career presents itself to the mind depends on the age of the one having the experience. Children have no well developed 'self' and so of course there is no rapid review of the past life, but in the aged such rapid reviews are common.

Following Egger's article Sollier, Moulin, and Keller report additional experiences of those in imminent danger of death. (39.) Sollier finds the sentiment of beatitude common to all cases. This is not a positive feeling of well-being but rather it is the absence of pain. Moulin likewise finds an absence of

physical pain. Keller disagrees with the others in that he insists that in case of drowning there is a desperate struggle accompanied by great fear until exhaustion; then, he agrees, there is an absence of fear,—once the struggle is given up the drowning man lets himself go calmly to repose. So he grants the real point at issue.

Scott collected 25 cases of experiences near death. He finds the same absence of pain and fear but does not find the synthetic view of life reported by some observers. There are great variations,—“some slight irrelevant idea, or the thought of others being most frequent.” (38:103.) This fact of thinking of others which is so often observed lends strong support to the position of Egger when he holds that religion, in taking the final memories of a man as an indication of his feeling of responsibility to God, is only controlling and moralizing a natural phenomenon, for, as a matter of fact, the dying man is more often thinking of the judgment of his contemporaries and immediate posterity. (14:353.) In those who have been brought strongly under the influence of the Church we should of course expect to find this feeling of responsibility referred to God rather than to man, but an empirical study of the question seems to show that the feeling is more naturally directed to man. If this is true we have lost rather than gained by attempting to change the direction of the feeling, because the more natural direction must be regarded as having the stronger hold on human nature.

In the cases so far mentioned more attention has been given to the consciousness of those in danger of death by accident. There are of course certain differences to be observed in case the danger is from serious illness. As an excellent example of the mental state of one under such circumstances I take the following quotation,—“I, who in my living life had clung so hard to personality, had said there was no ‘*after*’ if the ego ceased to be, I, as I, did not exist. The individual was too little. And yet I was. And immortality, a continued being, an everlasting sleep, the continuance of self, annihilation even, or any other of the things which we desire or fear while this world shuts us in, just didn’t matter, for whatever was in that Beyond I knew was surely *best*.” (2:555.) This account is typical of what occurs in a great many cases of dangerous ill-

ness. There is an anaesthesia of the sensory end organs for pain and with the absence of pain there is no fear. The sick person loses interest in the affairs of life,—the will to live is deadened.

In many cases of serious illness there is of course no clear consciousness of the approach of death. The dying man, while still hoping to live, passes into a state of unconsciousness and dies. His attitude toward death does not consequently concern us especially.

The last words of the dying have often been quoted to show the attitude of the dying toward imminent death. An examination of many of these shows clearly that men die as they have lived and face death calmly and without fear. As typical examples I take the following:

“John Bunyan—Take me, for I come to thee.

“Thomas Paine (to Dr. Manley, who asked him, ‘Do you wish to believe that Jesus was the son of God?’)—I have no wish to believe on the subject.

“Rabelais—Ring down the curtain; the farce is over!” (5: 308sq.)

The dying are also often reported as having visions, and in these visions it has been noted that the faces of deceased loved ones often appear. This shows unquestionably that the consciousness of the dying tends very often to center on thoughts of others rather than on self.

In view of the facts given above it seems that we may safely accept the statement of Scott that “the conception of death does not awaken in the most of cases a very deep individualistic or self-centered consciousness. The centre of the idea of death and its radiations is outside of what is ordinarily called the self, and is essentially altruistic.” (38:118.)

In concluding this part of our study then we may say that a survey of the ontogenetic development of the attitude toward death and the types of belief in immortality shows that in the development of the individual as in the development of the race there is naturally more faith in and desire for plasmic and influential immortality than personal immortality. In no important respect is it necessary to change the conclusions reached in the study of the race.

CONCLUSION

We have endeavored to point out and interpret the essential characteristics of man's attitude toward death and the sources of his belief in a future life. One of the problems in which we have been most concerned is the relation between moral conduct on the one hand and the attitude toward death and the belief in a future life on the other. We have attempted to estimate the comparative strengths of the desire for personal, plasmic and influential immortality as controls of conduct. It is now in place to summarize our results and apply them to the question of moral and religious education.

To primitive man death is a mystery. He understands neither its cause nor its meaning. In the lowest tribes it is always supposed to be due to some supernatural force; no tribe thinks of it as being the end of individual existence. In fact, we have found that primitive men have a strong belief that death is not the end of life, that the ghost of a man lives on after death, and in the lowest societies this ghost is almost invariably greatly feared. Not infrequently it would seem that the ghost is feared more than death itself. But the future life is not eternal; after a time the ghost dies or returns to life as an infant. It is seldom that the other world is thought of as a place of reward and punishment.

The sources of the belief in a future life we have found to be numerous but the most fundamental of these have probably been the inability of the understanding to grasp the fact of death and the desire to know that the dead still live. Although these two have been supplemented by other forces they must be considered as primary. The persistence of the belief is of course largely due to its incorporation among the customary beliefs and traditions of the different religions.

The consciousness aroused by the idea of death is not, as has been generally supposed, primarily an egoistic one; it tends far more to center on others and so is to be considered as essentially altruistic. Man tends to think of the influence of his death on others rather than of its influence on himself.

We may now attempt to answer the question as to the value of the different types of belief in immortality as controls of conduct. In so doing let it be clearly understood that we are not raising the question as to whether these different beliefs

are or are not true: our problem is rather to determine the influence these beliefs may have on conduct, i. e., to determine their value as motives to action. We can neither prove nor disprove personal immortality but we can determine with more certainty the influence of the belief on the conduct of those who hold it.

There can be no question, I think, that the belief in a future existence in another world where one is rewarded or punished according to his life may often have considerable influence on conduct for good or for evil. There are of course those who believe that sound morality is impossible without the belief and so they urge it as the fundamental basis of all moral and religious instruction but that their position is not well taken the following quotation from Fox shows clearly:

“When modern Christians are disposed to be censorious, as modern Christians sometimes are, on those who hold not the like faith with themselves, for their want of the great death-hope which Christianity boasts,—when they point to the non-anticipating bed of the dying unbeliever, and, without regard for a life which may have been irreproachable, utter expressions of stern condemnation,—let it be remembered that such were the deaths of the patriarchs of humanity,—of the fathers of nations,—of the oldest members of that Church which in most theologies is identified with the Christian Church,—of those who are believed to have gone first into the kingdom of heaven, and to sit down with whom is one of the common descriptions of paradise. Thus bounded were their views and the futurity that presented itself to their minds was a futurity to be realized by their descendants, or their fellow creatures, in this our world.” (20:222sq.)

The above quotation points out clearly enough that the belief in personal immortality is not necessary for a life of high moral character, but it is not sufficient to let the argument rest here. A three-fold objection must be offered to making the belief the foundation of morality. The first of these is suggested by the following quotation from Powell:

“I doubt if the doctrine of immortality, as generally taught, has not been productive of more mischief than any other doctrine of a false creed. That which renders this life tame, despicable, a thing valueless, is precisely what we do not need,

and which we cannot too much regret. It is not religion, for it does not honor the noble, it does not worship the true and beautiful. It has no ideals but the unseen. Its skeptic is not the man who lacks faith in things, in man, in deeds, but he who lacks faith in ghosts and rituals." (Our Heredity from God, 4th ed., N. Y., 1889, p. 414.) From the ethical standpoint the doctrine, as generally taught, is even more objectionable because of the motive to which it so often appeals. There can be no question that in endeavoring to cause men to be good by threatening them with hell-fire we are appealing to a low part of their nature and cannot secure in such a manner the development of their higher and better moral and religious nature.

In the second place the belief in personal immortality as a basis of moral education may be opposed on the ground that it is by no means a secure one. With an increase in education the firm believer often becomes sceptical (29 and 41) and in such cases there is inevitably the danger that morals will be undermined along with the faith which serves as its foundation. This alone is a danger of no mean proportion.

But aside from the objections given, the attempt to found morality on belief in personal immortality neglects important psychological principles. If conduct is to be most effectively regulated it must be done by securing the proper development of natural tendencies and instincts. The higher moral characteristics must be connected with the fundamental instincts. Only in this way can the most effective and the surest permanent control of conduct be secured.

We have shown that the desire for plasmic and influential immortality is naturally stronger than the desire for personal immortality and there can be no question that the instincts from which the two former spring are among the strongest possessed by man. In fact, as McDougall says, "It is probable that these two instincts in conjunction, the reproductive and the parental instincts, directly impel human beings to a greater sum of activity, effort, and toil, than all the other motives of human action taken together." (Social Psychology, London, 1908, p. 269.) If this estimate of the strength and influence of the reproductive and parental instincts is correct—and I think we cannot safely question it—then there is no more secure basis upon which to build morality than upon the desire for earthly

immortality through posterity. In its wider irradiations this produces the desire to promote racial immortality and in so doing to secure individual immortality through one's influence in promoting the advancement of the race. To show the deeper meaning of this point of view we may well take the following quotation from President Hall:

"The 1,500,000,000 people, more or less, alive on the earth to-day are but a mere handful compared with the countless generations who are to proceed from their loins in the future. All posterity slumbers now in our bodies, as we did in our ancestors. They demand of us the supreme right and blessing of being well born, and they will have only curses for us if they awaken into life handicapped by our errors. Their interests should dominate all our lives, for that is living for the children, for our duty of all duties is to transmit the sacred torch of life undimmed, and if possible a little brightened, to our children's children in *saecula saeculorum*. This is the chief end of man and of woman. The welfare of all this cloud of witnesses is committed to our honor and virtue. The basis of the new biological ethics of to-day and of the future is that everything is right that makes for the welfare of the yet unborn and all is wrong that injures them, and to do so is the unpardonable sin—the only one nature knows" (*Eugenics Review*, Jan. 1910, p. 1sq.)

This point of view must be adopted by our system of moral and religious education if we are to do the greatest good. Such an ideal is at once more noble, more natural, and more attainable than have been the ideals that have dominated our education in the past and it must succeed.

If the view that our results have pointed to is correct and the desire for racial immortality is more natural and important then we should expect to see moral degeneration characterized by a lowering of the sense of honor which demands life under the best conditions for the unborn. The decay of a people would be paralleled by the decay in the parental instinct. According to Sutherland this is the case. (45:I. 125.) Greece and Rome fell and various other nations have fallen, not because of external foes, but because of the moral degeneration which caused a neglect of the duties of posterity.

With the proper system of moral and religious education, as

President Hall says,—“All longings for immortality will not be satisfied with the perpetuation of the shell of our selfish selves, but will focus on our immortal race as its true and proper object, with the larger perspective of all being in the background.” (Adolescence, I., 128.) Only in this way can we conform to the deepest instincts of the folk-soul, and in so doing secure the highest development both of the individual and of the race.

In bringing this paper to a close I wish to express my indebtedness to the numerous members of Clark University who have in various ways aided me from time to time, but especially must I express my obligation to President Hall for his unfailing suggestions, criticism, and encouragement.

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RELIGIOUS OFFERINGS IN JAPAN

By WILLIAM HUGH ERSKINE

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Man has created gods in his own image and according to his own needs. Happiness has been his chief pursuit as seen in the religious life among primitive peoples. In Japan the day for the *matsuri* is given over to holiday making, the temples are highly decorated, the people are dressed in their gayest clothing and none of the seriousness common to the religious life of the west is seen. It seems more like a picnic gathering than a band of worshippers.

On these festival occasions, at least one member of the family must go and pay his respects to the gods, and he the eldest son. Tracing this back we see that the eldest son himself was at one time considered the proper offering to the gods, when everything else failed. In the transition from the *sacrifice* of the eldest son, we find that he became the priest of the family, the religious head, the one to keep in touch with things divine, the one to keep the lights burning, to eat the food offered to the gods and thus by these functions get the divine power needed by the family.

This idea of the first son being the proper offering to the gods, is correlative with the first of the catch, the first of the grain, the first of one's handiwork, *i. e.*, the firstlings.

In the offering of the firstlings, man did not always offer the best that he was capable of producing, since he improved with experience, so we find man offering in addition, the best, the purest, the one without blemish, the perfect things.¹ In Japan we find the best rice, the best saké, the best tea, the best *mochi*, offered to the gods and also that the temple clothes are the best clothes.

A third thing to note, is that the offering is of vital importance

¹ In America we see the New Easter bonnet, the Sunday clothes, the clean shave, the best food, all for our religious sabbath. The Jews had their best wine, the best grain, the best of the flock, etc.

to the worshipper. In fact the food process is seen in the offering. In rice districts, the offerings are rice and rice products. In wheat districts, wheat and the wheat products. In tea districts, tea offerings. In the sweet potato districts, the sweet potato. In fishing districts, fish and fishing implements. The blacksmiths give iron offerings, the tinner, tin offerings, etc., etc. Thus every age and every trade has its proper offering, and the offering indicates the manner of the livelihood of the worshipper.

A fourth point, is that man has given the gods the traits of men and has endowed them with the gifts for pleasure common to men. The eldest son was offered because of the joy over the man child born in the family, and the promise of more children which it meant. The virgin was offered to show the desire to appease the gods with what gave man his highest enjoyment, for in that age the animal nature was in the ascendancy and not the intellectual or the ethical or spiritual. The dance of the *Kagura*, "god pleasure," shows forth man's effort to please the gods by giving the dance and food which delighted the eyes of man.

Thus to sum up, the offerings are the first, the perfect, the most vital, the commercially valuable, and the most enjoyable.

The classification of the offerings according to ages or work is a good aid to study but can not be said to show clear and distinct periods. One can not say that this offering began at this period and ended at another set time. All we can say is that one man tried a certain offering; it brought results; another tried it and it worked for him also, and it becomes the common use of the group as long as it brings results. This is illustrated in the story of the man with the wen on his face and the efforts of his jealous neighbor to follow his example and get his own removed.

The classification in this paper is a purely arbitrary one and one which I find fits the results of my study.

Port towns give the visitor to Japan a view of the new Japan with all the western improvements, and a few miles in the interior gives Japan as she was a few years ago. A hundred miles away from the beaten track gives Japan as she was a hundred years ago. Still farther in among the mountain people shows Japan as she was several hundred years ago. It was while traveling among the sea and mountain people in the

interior of the northeast that the facts of this paper were discovered.

PREHISTORIC CLASS.

For the purpose of clearness and as an aid to see the development of the offering, I have divided the offerings into twelve classes. The first are those of the time before Jimmu Tenno, when Japan was inhabited by the cave dwellers. That man wanted the desires of heart satisfied, and so as to show the gods what he wanted, he set apart the objects of his prayer. The prayer or desire set forth is seen in the *Emado* of every temple, where the prayers are pictured on a tablet of wood usually about six by four inches. The mother would have a picture of a woman of overflowing breasts, the man desiring to overcome the desire for *saké* or wine would have a picture of a wine barrel or bottle and a lock over it, meaning that he wanted his heart locked against the desire for drink.²

Our primitive Japanese wanted big nuts on the trees, and so he sets aside for the gods to see, big nuts as an offering. He wants clear water to drink, especially when the stream is muddy, or dry, so he sets aside the cup of water. This is still seen in the cup of water offered to the dying as the final service to one's dying relatives, it is called "*shinumizu*." The cup of water offered to the dead at the funeral, to the dead on the anniversaries, offered at the graves, on the family god shelf all the time, at the Holy places, at the high places, to the images of children, poured on the images as a work of merit, are good illustrations of its importance.

It must be borne in mind in the study of all ages, that the offering is to show the gods just what is wanted and not necessarily as a thank offering.

NATURAL CLASS.

The next age is that when man began to act like a human being, and his god takes on the traits of man. Our man selects his food and begins to live above the mere animal life. He wants good fruit on the trees, fine herbs, plants, fat and juicy

² Since writing the above paper, Dr. De Forest's daughter has published his notes on the *Emado* in a booklet called "*Ema*."

roots, all of the first rank, and so that the gods may know he selects the best and after admiring them, offers them to the gods in a very crude way. Natural plants are thought to have more divine power than the cultivated ones, even today. In addition to the fruit offerings and roots on the god shelf of the Shintoists, we have the offering of the many green plants in all parts of the empire. Especially sacred is the *sakaki*, the evergreen which at one time marked the holy places. The natural plants used in all funerals in Japan are clearly a relic of this age.

FISHING CLASS.

Man could not live by plants alone, so he in his search for food finds the rivers and sea filled with fish. He soon becomes a skillful fisherman, and while enjoying his work on the banks of the rivers as much as the anglers of today, he counted it not luck but divine power which gave him the fifteen pounder so well described in Kipling's American Notes. That the gods might know the size and the kind wanted, the best of the catch are offered. The *sonaedai*, offered seabream, is on every god shelf, even many miles away from the sea. The efforts of the fisherman to appease the gods, for the good catch, for the prosperity of the village, for the control of the waves, for the safe return of the men fishing at sea, are seen in every fishing hamlet. One of the three most prosperous temples in Japan is a fisherman's temple, where there is a wooden fish offered to the gods. A piece of this wood boiled in water will give a drink which is considered the best charm and cure-all for the fisherman, and the best aid in pregnancy for their women.

HUNTING CLASS.

Rainy days, or days when the waves were high, drove our Japanese into the mountains for food. To insure a good catch and the safety of the hunters in future expeditions, since many lives were often lost in capturing the wild beasts, the best of the catch, or the best of the flesh of the catch was offered. The many superstitions about the gods demanding the human being for food and the efforts to overcome these have produced in every hamlet a saviour, so that we are not surprised to find in

all parts and in all their religions the conspicuous part which a saviour plays in their religious life. Many westerners thinking that the idea of a saviour was borrowed from Christianity, but the idea was in Japan long before the time of the Christ.

Most of the offerings of this age were the best part of the beasts or of special parts thought to have special healing power, as the *liver*. These are offered and left on the god shelf so as to come in contact with the divine power and then are used for miraculous healing. The flesh was offered in much the same way, and then the eldest of the family ate this while the rest of the family looked on religiously. The best illustration of this class of meat offerings is seen in the story of the Ainu, now so common to American readers. The bear is captured and the gods thanked for their aid by the whole animal being offered and then after much religious ceremony partaken of by the tribe. The eating is as much a religious ceremony as the praying, for in eating divine power is obtained.

Among the Japanese proper, we see the offerings of fowls, rabbits, deer, wild boars, etc. And before the day of Buddhistic influence much meat was offered in all parts of Japan. A visit to Nara will show the part the deer has played in the life of the people.

PASTORAL CLASS.

The fifth age is that of the time when man trained his own animals for food and work. The cow is easily trained to be milked and the life of the tribe is prolonged. The ox and the horse and even the dog soon learn to pull the loads for the man and thus his life is made easier. These blessings are the gifts of the gods, who were at first, themselves animals, as the *Shimmei*, god horse; *shingyu* or god ox, etc.

A study of the *eta* or pariah of Japan will show the part the pastoral life had before the introduction of Buddhism. Yet while flesh eating has been forbidden, the pastoral age is clearly seen in the life of the people. Man needed a horse for war, bulls for pulling, dogs for watching and hunting, etc., and these wants are in the hands of the god. There is no ethical phase as in the sin offering of the Jews; yet the animals play their part in the development of the race.

AGRICULTURAL CLASS.

The sixth classification is that growing out of the need for food for man and beast. After roving over hill and dale and finding none, our early Japanese settled down to home life and to the cultivation of the fields around him and becomes the *hyakusho* or farmer. The fields are planted and watered by man but the gods give the increase, and so as to get this increase, the religious festivals connected with seed time and harvest arise. The first and the best of the grain are offered to show just what is wanted for next year. The *Ninamisai*, or new rice, *Kwannamisai* or god tasting, *Higan* or Equinoxes, the *doyadoya* or naked dance, the New Year or sun returning festivals, the many set days for the planting and transplanting, etc., connected with *Inarisan*, or *Hachimansan*, patron gods of the rice field, etc., are some of the many festivals of this age and class.

Out of the many agricultural feasts have grown many rites connected with the life of the family. The time for the wedding is when the plants are mating. The many stories connected with phallic worship and the sexual life too licentious to tell in a paper were as object lessons to the gods to show them what they could do for the crops. These stories must not be judged from our standpoint, their food depended on the successful crop, and as man seeks to be successful today, so the man of old sought the same, but with a different standard, and, who knows perhaps the people of a hundred years hence will be shocked and disgusted to read of our, to them, heathenish ways.

In addition to the food offerings there has developed during this age, the drink offerings. Japanese learned to make drink from the rice, which is called *saké*, and as these gave him a "divine" feeling, he soon offers some to his gods, at first much as the drunken man offers it to his friends. The drink offering is part of all the religions of Japan. Much as in the west the drink offering is a serious part of the offering and it is only when the ethical side of the religion is emphasized that there is a sentiment against it and then only after a great struggle is the drink offering done away.³

³ Witness the great conflict in the Christian Church over the substitution of unfermented wine for the fermented wine of the past.

Evaporation was not known to the primitive man so that the best of the wine was thought to be drunk by the gods. The *Miki* is on every god shelf, the kegs of saké are offered to the spirit of the dead soldiers on the Memorial Days. These services are usually held out in the open and the barrels are piled high, sometimes as many as a thousand being offered at one time, the usual count from one hundred and one to seven. (All offerings are to be odd numbers, never even numbers of anything.) Every visitor at the shrine is given a taste of the consecrated wine by the priest in charge on the payment of a small fee.

The eating and drinking together religiously, as of the forty-seven Ronins, and of other groups before any great task, or the drinking together of those about to commit suicide, all are for the purpose of getting divine aid in the task before them.

MANUFACTURING CLASS.

We come now to the Industrial classes and the offerings of the laboring class, for farming man needed tools and it took much time to keep in practice to make good tools so one set of men are set aside to make tools for farming and for war. This is the beginning of the trades and guilds in Japan.

As in all other classes, the best of the handiwork was consecrated and given to the gods of that particular trade. We have in this age the specialization of the gods as well as the specialization of work. A visit to any temple will show the efforts of the laborers to get a pair of wooden or iron clogs large enough for the gods to wear, or of tools of all kinds big enough for the gods to use.

As to just how Idolatry arose, the historians are not agreed. In old Japan the Emperor's picture has been honored from time immemorial. At first it was a crude likeness which was sent to all parts of the empire, so that the people might behold their king. Along with this picture went the story of his descent from the gods and of his divine rights. These pictures after the death of the Emperor were held over and honored and soon it becomes worship of the dead Emperor. "Picture reverence" is still a religious rite in Japan today, as on every holiday the school children gather before the closed doors of a shrine in

the School assembly hall or on the campus somewhere. On the call of the soldier-teacher, the principal opens the doors and the whole student body bow, formerly in worship but now in reverence, much as the saluting of the flag in the United States.

Another view, and in all probability a half truth, is that the men cunning with the hands made images of the dead Emperors or heroes, of course idealizing them. These at first were given by the artists as offerings to the gods, but as time went on, there arose a people who knew not Joseph and the idols instead of being offerings, become the gods whom the people thought served their fathers and whom they want to serve them, and so soon a hole is made in the back of the head for the spirit of the god to come in and abide and leave his blessing and divine power.

It is probably by a combination of the two theories mentioned that we get idolatry in Japan. The idols are the consecrated gifts of the artists in their efforts to develop both patriotism and godly fear. They are the work of the artists and not of the priests. Each idol represents the conception of a god whom the people want to serve them. The thousand handed god is a groping after the almighty, the god of large abdomen is another groping after the all-wise one, omniscience, the larger the abdomen the wiser the man. Thus we might go through the thousands of images in Japan, each a groping after a god to satisfy a need of man.

The writer's classification of the religions of Japan is four-fold instead of three as most writers contend. Shintoism or the imageless patriotic cult; Confucianism or the ethical ancestral cult; Buddhism or the philosophical cult, and fourth Nature-image worship, which is the religion of the masses, and includes phases of the other cults and many things too superstitious to be allowed in the others. It is in a study of these people that the facts of the paper were discovered.

It is during the manufacturing age that the differences are clearly seen and magnified. Man built a home for himself and the gods are left out in the rain and cold. This can not be, so we see groups combine and erect a temple or shrine for *their* patron god. A man will not work for a god who will not serve him, hence the differences in the gods are now beginning to be noted. People worship the god who serves them and only so

long as he does serve them, witness the tearing down of shrines and the destruction of temples common in Japan when the gods fail to send rain.

The Imageless cult with its holy ground was not so ready to cover its holy enclosure surrounded as it was with *sakaki*, or evergreen, and with the red *torii* at the entrance, a beautiful sight to behold. But the Buddhists had shelter for the gods and a place for men to assemble under a roof, and soon the Shintoists are divided and we have in Japan today some of the Shinto shrines covered and some uncovered.

The many *torii* in front of the covered or uncovered Shrines, are the beginning of the thank offerings, as one is erected every time the gods hear the special prayers of the people. One shrine has one hundred *torii*, this shows that it is popular and that the gods hear and answer prayers. Many rich houses in Japan who worship at the fox shrine have erected many beautiful *torii* in front of their shrines.

COMMERCIAL CLASS.

Man soon learns to barter if he finds some one who has something which he needs or wants badly. The religious life demands time and energy; moreover he finds from experience with exacting gods that it is no small job to work out his own salvation, and since other vocations have skilled men, why not have skilled men in religion, men who are adept in persuading the gods and in the art of prayer? The men familiar with the *old* forms of speech and with the *old* ceremonies are at first selected, the ways of the fathers being thought the only way to get the favor of the gods. The ancient way of doing things has always appealed to religious men as the true way, the old way brought blessings to the fathers, whom we have idealized and the details of whose every-day troubles we have forgotten. This scheme of getting men skilled in the power of winning the divine favor soon led to the priesthood and its establishment. These men became very proficient by experience, and soon the whole religious life of the people is turned over to the priests. He must keep the gods happy while the other men are allowed to seek their own happiness, and men are willing to pay. Religion makes the priests and not the priests the religion. The priests start out in all honesty to serve the people but as the people drift away from

the temple life, they wish to make their job sure and soon wrap it in rites and mystery which they alone understand. In this age we see the beginning of the consecration of money as well as the setting apart of certain men to care for the temples, such as the setting apart of the Levites. In the manufacturing age before the establishment of the priesthood, the men of the group or town worked together to erect the temple, then they called carpenters at will, but after the priesthood is firmly established, the average man seemed too defiled to attend to this work. This is seen in the consecration and purification of the carpenters to build the train, the decorators of the train and all the paraphernalia, the rice planters of the special rice, the street cleaners, etc., in the preparation for the coronation this Fall. In Japan it is state and religion.

Man still needs divine power to be successful in life. He has found that money is powerful for everything in this age and he now uses his money to buy divine power. He gives his check on the bank with the same object in mind, and with the same consecration as the primitive man gave nuts, etc., *i. e.*, divine power is needed in the struggle for existence. The check represents the results of his labors, the personalizing of his desires, and the giving of what is most necessary to his life, money. "This giving of money is right, and when accompanied with good works and noble living is efficacious, but when apart from good works it leads to a non-religious and non-ethical giving which benefits neither man nor priest," says a Buddhist priest, *after* the ethical side had become emphasized.

INTELLECTUAL CLASS.

Money being the craze in the commercial world, it gradually was seen that the man with executive ability was the man who made money easily, and that, therefore, education was the thing which gives man the proper perspective and a hold on things divine. Thus the ideal becomes the educated man, the educated priest, and education is the ruling passion of the day and consequently poems, songs, prayers, addresses, books on religion or the repeating of the beautiful prayers in religious service, the preaching of the silver-tongued orators, the belief in certain doctrines (which have been revealed to the intellect of man, and to which the gods demand an intellectual obedience) become

in a sense works of merit which win the divine power that man needs in the struggle for life and the pursuit of happiness.

It is in this way that the denominations arise. The priests work out their peculiar doctrine which they think pleases the gods and which they believe will give man a better hold on things religious and divine, and we have as a result the different sects warring over intellectual differences. Buddhism and Shintoism both suffered during this age and were divided and interdivided over hair-splitting doctrines.

Religion now becomes a form of doctrine, and develops into a cold philosophy like Buddhism or into a weak nature or image worship, something which can be seen and which appeals to the eye of the uneducated.

SYMPATHETIC OFFERINGS.

To side step a minute, let us look at another class of offerings, not in the economical classification:—the offering of their hair by women as a cure for sickness, or for ropes in the erecting of temples, or for overcoming family troubles; the offering of parts of one's enemy, either his finger parings, his hair, or a drop of blood, or even a part of his clothing, or a painting or image of the one to be affected or killed as in the *Ushi-no-toki-no-maeri* (going to the temple at the time of the ox about 2 A. M.) These and others similar are seen in all ages and among all classes of people, and seem to be a relic of the days of hunting; as the dogs were given the scent so the gods must be given the right scent or the curse will not fall on the right one.

FREAKS OF NATURE.

Another side line, is the discussion of the offerings known as the spirit filled, such as the freaks of nature; strange or peculiarly shaped stones, rocks, stumps of trees, or suddenly appearing stones in the path of man. The westerner when he stumbles curses the thing in his path, whereas the easterner, from fear of a good or bad spirit dwelling in the object, worships it for its blessing or for the overcoming of its curse. The stone or obstacle is placed by the roadside and the wayfarer pays his respects every time he passes. This practice led to the setting aside the things which he thought brought him luck. The lucky

stones, the queer trees by the wayside, which by walking around bring luck, the tools which used brought luck, all at first are set aside as offerings to the gods and then later become the objects of worship. Everywhere in Japan we see trees which have been fenced around and a *torii* (gateway) erected in front. The trees growing upside down, *i. e.*, with the roots for branches as at Kyoto, the prolific branched tree as at Nara which is used in place of the phallic worship of yore, etc., are some of the numerous illustrations.

Such things can not be classified, save as freaks of nature, which one man worked for his good and which others have tried, some successfully and others unsuccessfully, the object not being a god but an object holding divine power.

ETHICAL CLASS.

Returning to the line of thought of the paper, man finds that no amount of superstition, money, or education apart from good works gives peace of mind, nor will they guarantee happiness or success. Famine, pestilence, calamity and wars continue in the land. The thought then turns toward the priests and they are at first accused of not being faithful; they have lost their influence with the gods, and can not get the divine power needed. The faithful priests now turn to the people and insist that the gods are ever willing to bless the priests and those pure, but they will not bless the people of unclean lives. Clean hands and clean heart are demanded and in an effort to get this the ceremonial washings are introduced. Purification and the rites of purification come to the front, the outward form symbolizing the inward cleansing. The lavar for the washing of the hands before praying is placed before the shrine and the ceremonial baths are introduced, and we get an outwardly clean people. The baths of the Japanese are a part of the religious duty. The culmination of this washing is found in the Emperor's New Year's morning bath, which he performs no matter how cold the weather or the water, and is called *Hatsumizu*, beginning water. Meiji Tenno was faithful in the performance of this rite although the present Emperor, because of his weak physical condition, has the water made tepid. This is to guarantee a prosperous year for his people.

The next step is easily seen as following naturally the demand for cleanliness of the inner man, purity of heart and mind. Success and manhood are linked together and the ethical side of the Japanese religions now appear. The offerings now take on the ethical as well as the personal and social phases. The best illustration of this is the writer of the "*Onna Daigaku*" when he teaches "Even if you do not say your prayers, if you are faithful the gods will take care of you." "*Chujitsu na kokoro inori senakutemo Kami sama mamori.*" The words of Jesus are a parallel to this, "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and its righteousness and all these things shall be added unto you." So is Meiji Tenno's poem, "the faithful man lives in communion with the Unseen God." The teaching of the poem concerns Nintoku Tenno, the Emperor who saw the suffering of his people and released them from paying taxes for three years, teaching thereby that the gods and the Emperor sees the faithful and supplieth them.

The rules of the Samurai or Bushido give the teaching of the ethical side of the Japanese life, faithfulness being defined as obedience to the higher powers. *Harakiri* is a final act of consecration to one's duty to his lord. The one criticism was and is that it is based on the patriotic side only and as everything is fair in love and war, there are many practices taught which the Japanese themselves are ashamed of, such as concubinage, the end justifies the means, the slavery of the under classes, etc. For the best side of Bushido, see Dr. Nitobe's book.

HUMAN SACRIFICES.

The offering of the living to appease the gods is not the highest stage in the evolution of the offering, but common to all ages, the thing to be tried whenever everything else fails, it is the court of last resort, the supreme gift in any age. In Japan the fisher would give his first born or virgin daughter to appease the waves, the hunter his son or daughter to appease the gods of the wild beasts, the pastoral people his son for the overcoming of a plague, the agriculturist would bury the dead or the dying in his field so as to secure a better harvest and ward off ravaging insects, the builder of temple, bell or bridge would invoke the divine blessing by sacrificing a human being, the warrior would sacrifice himself to appease the gods of war

and also to inspire his followers, etc. These are known as "ikiumi," living burial, and are treated in a paper which appeared in the JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY, November, 1914.

PERSONALITY OR CHARACTER CLASS.

The twentieth century is known as the age of personality, and in Japan in all things abreast of the times, everything is "*jinkaku*." The magazines cry for men of character and they are seeking to discover and produce men of character as the greatest need of the times. The men of the past are being idealized and even the gods of old Japan are proven to be men of strong personalities, the highest ideal being the Buddhist priest who prayed that he might be born *again* as a man that he might spend his life in prayer in behalf of the people. The nation is not satisfied with the low standard of morality. Most Japanese novels of the present day deal with the unclean life of the upper class and the final victory of the man of character even though of a lower class. Character and living sacrifices in social service are the needs and the cry of the Japanese.

LITERATURE: BOOKS, ETC.

Phasen der Liebe. By F. MÜLLER-LYER. München: Albert Langen, 1913. Pp. xv + 254.

This is the fifth volume of the comprehensive work published by the author under the general title, "Die Entwicklungsstufen der Menschheit." *Phasen der Liebe* stands in close connection with the two preceding volumes, *Die Familie*, and *Formen der Ehe, der Familie und der Verwandtschaft*.

The transformation of the love feeling, of the marriage motive, and of the forms and phases of the acquisition of wives are discussed in the first three chapters. The discussion of the phases of marriage, the phases and the causes of the social position of woman, and the instability (*Labilität*) of sex customs complete the first part of the book.

In a brief *Allgemeiner Teil* are set forth the theoretical principles which guide the author in his systematic investigation of society. Accepting Comte's pronouncement that we have science only where what is known permits prevision, he asks, "Can sociology become a science?" His answer is, "Yes, provided it succeeds in discovering the lines of direction of social development." Each separate culture—domain (industry and commerce, family, state, religion, science, etc.) must be investigated from the origins to the present time, and the successive phases of its development ascertained. Thus the lines of direction of progress and the laws of evolution appear.

The enormous complexity which the mutual influence exerted by each aspect of culture upon the others—of industry upon science and vice versa, for instance—introduces into the prediction of future social forms is, of course, not to be overlooked. The sociologist may, nevertheless, at least hope to determine what are the highest culture forms towards which society is advancing.

In the last chapter the author attempts to apply the scientific method just described to the sociological domain investigated in the first part of the book. His conclusions will be found on pages 238-240. The more general line of development, apparent not only in the phases through which love has passed, but in every other aspect of culture, is described as an increased rationalization and humanization (*Vermenschlichung*) of the world, due to an increasing development of the human will and, more directly, to the increasing development of intelligence. JAMES H. LEUBA.

Religion und Magie bei den Naturvölkern. By Dr. KARL BETH. Leipzig: Teubner, 1914. Pp. xi + 238.

This book is in substance an attempt to demonstrate the independence of religion from magic with regard to origin and nature. In the first chapters are discussed the theories of Frazer, Marett, Preuss and Vierkandt, in so far as they regard magic as a forerunner of religion, either

because magic passed into religion, or because the failure of magic became the incentive to the development of religion.

According to Beth, who in this follows recent authors, certain original forms of magic are independent of any idea of power, be it animistic or not; while the original religious reaction was brought out by the recognition of the presence of a supranatural and suprasensible, non-personal power, distinct from the forces belonging to the human and animal world. Belief in the existence of a power of that description is found among most of the primitive populations; it is the Mana of the Melanesian, the Wakonda of the Sioux, the Manitou of the Algonquin, the Mulungu of the Bantau, etc.

In the presence of this power man, according to our author, assumes not the attitude characteristic of magic, but that of religion, i. e., the attitude of awe and of humble dependence, leading to prayer and worship (pp. 208, 211). This power need not be, and originally is not, conceived as personal. Yet, the feeling of veneration which it induces leads to prayer and worship (pp. 209, 211, 212). Whether man's behavior is to be called religion or magic depends not essentially upon the nature of the power with which he thinks himself in relation, but upon the kind of feeling-reaction he makes to it (p. 212).

It is an error, thinks our author, to suppose that the fear of particular phenomena lead man to the belief in the suprasensible power; fear was a very secondary motive. Nature, particularly perhaps the night sky, awakened in man an astonished awe and a sense of weakness. These were the dominant emotions of the early religious reaction (p. 227). Later on, with the appearance of gods and daemons, a second religious level was reached—second, but not necessarily higher—which in most lands obliterated, at least for a period, the first level.

In the magic attitude there is no humility, no feeling of dependence; but rather a deliberate, self-reliant seeking of a particular advantage through definite means. "Magic and religion are opposites; they cannot be united" (p. 222).

The readers of recent anthropological literature will find very little that is new in Beth's volume and probably also little to criticise beyond the slurring of the difference which, it seems to me, must exist in the conception of powers calling forth on the one hand awe and a sense of weakness and nothing more; and, on the other, these emotions and in addition prayer and worship. I should insist that any power eliciting prayer and worship is thereby shown to have been, at the time, conceived of as personal. It is, however, not the fact that a power is personal which alone determines the kind of relation which man is to maintain with him. A personal power becomes an object of magic when instead of appealing to him by what I may call here psychological means (expression of submission, of humility, prayer, offerings, etc.), man thinks himself able to coerce him by non-psychological (magic) means.

The genetic independence of religion from magic—the main thesis of our author—is affirmed and defended in a book published by the reviewer a few years ago, but apparently not known to Beth. JAMES H. LEUBA.

A beginner's psychology. By EDWARD BRADFORD TITCHENER. New York: Macmillan, 1915. 362 p.

The author here tries to write the kind of a book that he would have himself found useful when he was beginning the study of psychology, thirty years ago. He find it hard to relate the new book to the older "Primer," which will not be revised for every paragraph has been rewritten. The greatest change, however, is that of attitude, less stress here being laid upon knowledge than upon the point of view. The author has tried to make his essay a model of clear thought, and with his high ideals of lucidity of both thought and language has succeeded to a greater degree than his preface gives us to infer he has realized himself. He has avoided the term "consciousness" as too slippery, and fears that the term "introspection" is "traveling the same road," though the time to drop it has not yet come. The work in its older form has been a valuable *vade mecum* for years to all students approaching the subject and this promises to be still more so.

The natural order of spirit; a psychic study and experience. By LUCIEN C. GRAVES. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1915. 365 p.

This book, we are told, is a work of compulsion. The author has had new experiences and seen new light. In the chapters the author gives us first a testimony to open-minded and reverent treatment of the future life and its psychic study. Next comes a testimony to creative adaptations and to a spiritual foundation. He then discusses the marvels of the ether, its energy and basic nature, the natural order of the spirit, the objectivity of the spirit world, historic approach to the spirit body, a word further on the origin and derivation of the spirit, testimony to spirit communion and communications, telepathy as a subterfuge from the spiritistic theory, an exhortation to come to the spiritistic interpretation, testimony concerning the skeptical intellect and the spirit communication. Then come experimental testimony, psychic bridging of the chasm, with successive dated sittings, discussion of mental picturing, of Myers' interview, and so on, through several chapters.

Theism and humanism. By ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR. New York: Hodder and Stoughton, (c. 1915). 274 p.

This book constitutes the Gifford Lectures of 1914. The introductory lecture deals with metaphysics and the plain man, inevitable beliefs, the character of theism and what atonement is not. The second lecture discusses design and selection, develops the arguments from values, the cognitive and the causal system. The second part deals with aesthetic and ethical values, discussing aesthetics and theism, and ethics and theism; while the third part treats of intellectual values, and after an introductory chapter discusses perception, common sense and science, probability, calculable and intuitive uniformity and causation, tendencies of scientific belief, while the fourth part is a summary and conclusion.

The Ethiopic liturgy; its sources, development, and present form. By SAMUEL A. B. MERCER. Milwaukee: Young Churchman Co., 1915. 487 p.

This very learned work discusses first the sources and earliest form of the Ethiopic liturgy, treating its background, the Christian liturgy of the first four centuries, each in detail, concluding that the earliest complete Ethiopic liturgy was that of St. Mark, reconstructed in its probable fifth century form. The second part treats the development of the present form of the Ethiopic liturgy, first to the end of the *Missa Catechumenorum*, then from the beginning of the *Missa Fidelium* to the end of the institution, and finally to the end of the service, concluding that the Ethiopic liturgy is the *Ordo Communis* with the *Anaphora* of the apostles. Seventy-two pages of the book are devoted to photographs of the Mercer manuscript.

Story of Jesus for young and old. A complete life of Christ written in simple language, based on the gospel narrative. By JESSE LYMAN HURLBUT. Philadelphia: John C. Winston Co., (c. 1915). 496 p.

The author, who is well and favorably known as a writer in this field, here comes to tell the story of Jesus Christ in a manner attractive to both old and young, to children and teachers. The narrative is thus adapted to the child as young as ten, so that he will not need to ask the meaning of a sentence or a word. In order to lead the younger readers to and not from the Bible there are no imaginary scenes or conversations, so that the book is a biography of Jesus and not a romance founded upon his life. The work is extremely attractive and readable and is illustrated by cuts on almost every other page, many of them colored. It is an admirable family book.

India and its faiths; a traveler's record. By JAMES BISSETT PRATT. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1915. 493 p.

The twenty-one chapters in this book give students with any cultural bent an excellent view of this subject, so voluminously written about. Among other things the author treats of Hindu worship, pilgrims, the many gods and one god, duty and destiny, Dharma, teachers, priests and holy men, reform movements within, the Brahmo and Arya Samaj, the Theosophists, the Kabir Panthis and the Sikhs, the Jainas, the Mohammedans, Parsees, Buddhists, education and reform, doctrines of modern Buddhism, its value and springs of power, Christian missions in India, what the West might learn.

A surgeon's philosophy. By ROBERT T. MORRIS. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Page & Co., 1915. 581 p.

In two-score chapters the author tells us how he had to construct a working religion of his own, and so came to worship the conventional physical entities and their combinations which appeared in all substances and activities. Among the topics discussed are religion, theology, the soul, sin, Christian Science, prophets, neurotics, clairvoyants, Freud, can-

cer, dogs, potatoes, trees, Santayana, eyes, graft, styles in dress, socialism, marital modernity, suffrage, news, smart set, etc.

The ten commandments, with a Christian application to present conditions. By HENRY SLOANE COFFIN. New York: Hodder and Stoughton, (c. 1915). 216 p.

This is a collection of ten sermons on the ten commandments, and the writer tells us they were motivated by the war which "suddenly thrust us back into a day of pagan horrors. The folly of the strife bewildered us. Whither had wisdom flown? Its iniquity filled us with loathing and we were driven to ask ourselves afresh what was wisdom and what was righteousness." Hence the moral bases of life are here re-examined and the primary ethical ideals of Christianity are scanned with new interest.

The basis of morality. By ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER. Translated with introduction and notes by Arthur Brodrick Bullock. New York: Macmillan, 1915. 288 p.

After an introduction, part two is devoted to a critique of Kant's basis of ethics; part three to the founding of ethics; and part four to the metaphysical explanation of the primal ethical phenomenon. The original work, of which this is a translation, was written in 1840, and twenty years elapsed before a second edition. This translation was first published in 1903 and only now has a second edition been called for.

Origin and meaning of the Old Testament. By THEODORE WEHLE. New York, R. F. Fenno & Co., (c. 1914). 199 p.

This book treats first of the Hebrew records in themselves, then of the invasion of Canaan and the establishment of the monarchy; then follow the division in the kingdom to the fall of Samaria, history of Judah to the destruction of Jerusalem, the exile and the return, and finally, the foundation of Judaism in general. At the end is a convenient chronological table. It is an excellent introduction to the subject, which is all it claims to be.

The positive background of Hindu sociology. Book 1.—Non-political. By BENOY KUMÁR SARKÁR, with appendices by Brajendranath Seal. Allahabad: The Pānini Office, Bhuvaneśwari Āsrama, Bahadurganj, 1914. 388 p.

The first book contains an account of the non-political writings, including landmarks and milestones in the political history of India, unity and diversity of Indian life. This is followed by a treatise on the data of Indian geography, ethnology, mineralogy, ancient Indian botany, zoology, with various somewhat technical appendices. This whole volume is meant to be an introduction to the author's English translation of a Sanskrit work on sociology.

The Arya Samaj; an account of its origin, doctrines, and activities, with a biographical sketch of the founder. By LAJPAT RAI. With a preface by Sidney Webb. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1915. 305 p.

This is a very interesting account of the early life, the struggles and the teachings of Dayananda and the organization which he established.

We have here not only his religious inclinations but his social ideals and aims, methods of organization, relations to politics, the educational propaganda, philanthropic activities, with certain conclusions, and a number of illustrations of the hero of the book and his work.

Jesus and his parables. By GEORGE MURRAY. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1914. 305 p.

The writer makes a very different division of the parables, of which he makes twenty-nine, from that of Jülicher. The former's groups are 1, grace in the individual life; 2, Pharisaism, the foe; 3, fellowship with God and the ideal; 4, the course of the kingdom; 5, discipline and judgment. All classifications of the parables of course are more or less arbitrary and no doubt very different groupings could be made with equal justification. Nevertheless groupings are necessary.

The inspiration of responsibility, and other papers. By CHARLES H. BRENT. New York: Longmans, Green, 1915. 236 p.

This work is a reprint of twenty-three papers and addresses given at various times, of which the title designates only the first eleven pages. Other interesting addresses are on Abraham Lincoln, Queen Victoria, McKinley, the coronation of George V, national awakening in the Philippines, prayer, Alexander Hamilton, financial missionaries, Christian unity, the world missionary conference, human brotherhood, the home, etc.

Divine inspiration. By GEORGE PRESTON MAINS. New York: Hodder and Stoughton, (c. 1915). 171 p.

The successive chapters prove that inspiration is probable and universal, deal with Hebrew inspiration, the Bible, its relation to science, a human book and not inerrant. Other chapters urge that religion is progressive, inspiration continuous, describe the spiritual mind, and point out the relation between inspiration and immortality.

Christian psychology. By JAMES STALKER. New York: Hodder and Stoughton, n. d. 281 p.

The chapters are, From Individuality to Personality; Body, Soul and Spirit; The Five Senses; Memory; Imagination; Habit; Reason; Heart; Will; and Conscience. There are appendices on Temperaments, and Relations between Psychology and Evangelism.

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